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I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Sixth Amendment Cases
HE United States Supreme Court issued four opinions during the
Survey period addressing the protections encompassed by the sixth
amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel. ' In the first case,
Moran v. Burbine,2 the police adequately warned the accused Burbine of his
fifth amendment rights surrounding interrogation. 3 The police did not tell
Burbine that counsel, retained on his behalf by a third party, had tried to
contact him. Burbine based his attack on the conviction primarily on fifth
amendment grounds, but he also argued that the conduct of the police af-
fected the integrity of the attorney-client relationship, thus violating the
sixth amendment's right to counsel clause.4 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the six-to-three majority, rejected the sixth amendment argument by af-
firming the principle that the right to counsel attaches only after the adver-
sary judicial proceedings have begun.5
The bright line approach of Moran v. Burbine produced a far different
result in the second Supreme Court opinion, Michigan v. Jackson.6 A five-
Justice majority decided that an assertion of the right to counsel during ar-
raignment created an absolute bar to subsequent uncounseled, police-initi-
ated interrogation.7 Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that
once a suspect becomes an accused, the right to counsel is of such impor-
tance that police may no longer use means of eliciting information from an
uncounseled defendant that may have been proper at an earlier stage. This
* B.S.B.A., University of Arkansas; J.D., Southern Methodist University.
1. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966), imposed on the police an obligation,
prior to the initiation of questioning, to fully apprise the suspect in custody of the State's
intentions to use his statements to secure a conviction, of his right to remain silent, and to have
counsel present.
4. 106 S. Ct. at 1145, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 425.
5. Id. at 1145-47, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 425-28 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972)).
6. 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986).
7. Id. at 1411, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 642.
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rule applies even if the accused waived the right to counsel prior to arraign-
ment and received Miranda warnings after arraignment but before giving the
statement.8
Moran and Jackson both address the issue of when the accused's right to
counsel attaches. The Texas courts have addressed this same issue in four
noted cases during the survey period. In Martinez v. State9 the San Antonio
court of appeals held that under Texas law the right to counsel does not
attach until formal charges are filed.' 0 Both the Martinez court and the
Houston court of appeals, in Sommermeyer v. State, I I held that an accused's
sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached to an accused at the
time he was videotaped refusing to take a breath test.12 Martinez was the
forerunner of two Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases addressing the
issue of an accused's right to counsel after an arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated but prior to the accused's making the decision to take a breath or
blood test.
In Forte v. State 13 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the
issue of when an accused's right to counsel attaches after a driving while
intoxicated arrest. Forte had been arrested for driving while intoxicated. At
the police station he was given Miranda warnings 14 and then was asked if he
would take a breath test for alcohol concentration.15 Forte's request for an
attorney was denied and he subsequently took a breath test. The results of
the breath test were introduced at his trial. The court of appeals reversed
the conviction, holding that the decision to provide a breath sample was a
"critical pretrial state" that triggered a limited right to counsel. 16 The court
of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals, holding that the Supreme
Court opinions in United States v. Gouveia 17 and Moran v. Burbine 18 man-
date that a "critical stage" entitling an accused to counsel cannot occur prior
to initiation of judicial proceedings. 19 The opinion held that Forte's right to
counsel did not attach until the time a formal complaint was filed, an event
8. Id. at 1409, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 639-40.
9. 712 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no pet.).
10. Id. at 245. Martinez cites Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972), as authority, with an accord given to Keys v. State, 486 S.W.2d 958 Tex. Crim. App.
1972). Turner and Keys, however, only considered the applicability of the sixth amendment to
a claimed right to counsel.
11. 713 S.W.2d 1833 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
12. Sommermeyer, 7131 S.W.2d at 188; Martinez; 721 S.W.2d at 244-45.
13. 686 S.W.2d 744, 754 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985) (opinion on rehearing), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 707 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 9186) (en banc).
14. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-70 (1966).
15. 707 S.W.2d at 90. The State's right to demand a breath test is implicitly found in
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
16. 686 S.W.2d at 754. Although not specifically mentioning a particular federal or state
constitutional provision, the court clearly based the opinion upon the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution, stating that the right to counsel can attach at any stage in which
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. Id. at 752 (citing
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (19167)).
17. 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
18. 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 410 (1986). For a discussion of Miranda see supra note 3
and accompanying text.
19. 707 S.W.2d at 92.
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that occurred after the breath test was offered. 20 The court refused to con-
sider whether Forte's right to counsel under state law had been denied, re-
manding that issue to the court of appeals. 21
Later in the term the court of criminal appeals considered the issue again
in McCambridge v. State22 with similar results. McCambridge, when re-
quested to take the breath test, repeatedly requested counsel. 23 The court of
appeals had rejected McCambridge's argument that he had a limited right to
counsel before deciding whether or not to take the breath test.24 Citing
Forte, the court of criminal appeals affirmed, since the appellant's sixth
amendment right to counsel did not attach until the complaint and informa-
tion were filed. 25 As in Forte, McCambridge was remanded to the court of
appeals to determine if independent state constitutional authority applied.26
McCambridge also contended that the police violated the prophylactic
safeguards of Miranda v. Arizona 27 and Edwards v. Arizona,28 by continuing
to ask for a breath sample despite McCambridge's repeated requests for
counsel. 29 Appellant McCambridge recognized that under South Dakota v.
Neville30 a person faced with the decision whether to provide a breath or
blood sample is not entitled to the prophylactic safeguards of Miranda, but
argued that since he was given Miranda warnings, the police were required
to honor his invocation of the rights by requesting counsel. 31 The court of
criminal appeals held that nothing existed in the record to indicate that the
continued questioning of McCambridge constituted "interrogation" or that
the questions resulted in any incriminating response. 32 The opinion by
Judge Campell noted that the giving of Miranda warnings that do not apply
to the decision to take a breath test can cause confusion, but held that the
facts of McCambridge's case did not require remedial measures. 33
20. Id.
21. Id. at 92-93.
22. 698 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), vacated, 712 S.W.2d 499
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
23. 712 S.W.2d at 501.
24. 698 S.W.2d at 398.
25. 712 S.W.2d at 502. The court of appeals held that appellant's decision to take the test
did not constitute a "critical stage." 698 S.W.2d at 394. The court of criminal appeals dis-
agreed with that holing insofar as it implied that a "critical stage" may arise prior to initiation
of formal adversary proceedings. 712 S.W.2d at 502 n.l 1.
26. 712 S.W.2d at 502-03.
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
29. 712 S.W.2d at 500.
30. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
31. 712 S.W.2d at 504.
32. Id. at 505.
33. Id. at 506.
Not only does the breath testing decision not involve custodial interrogation, it
also does not involve the privilege against self-incrimination. A rule that focuses
on preventing collection of a breath sample, merely because of a defendant has
been informed of his right to have counsel present if he is interrogated, would
severely restrict police officers in the pursuit of lawfully collecting evidence of
intoxication and, more significantly, do nothing to further protect the privilege
against self-incrimination.
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In the third Supreme Court case decided during the survey period, Maine
v. Moulton,34 the defendant and another were indicted on theft charges and
released on bail. The codefendant informed the authorities of Moulton's
plan to kill one of the prosecution witnesses. Upon suggestion by the au-
thorities, the codefendant recorded a meeting with Moulton in which
Moulton, without an attorney present, made numerous incriminating state-
ments about the pending charges. 35 The five-to-four opinion authored by
Justice Brennan held that the admission at trial of the incriminating state-
ments violated Moulton's sixth amendment right to counsel.36 Once
charged, the defendant was entitled to rely on counsel as a medium between
him and the prosecution. 37 The right to counsel included the prosecution's
affirmative obligation not to circumvent the right by a knowing exploitation
of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present. 38
The opinion clearly indicated that the evidence concerning the crime for
which the defendant had not been indicted would be admissible at a trial
limited to those charges. 39 Moulton was somewhat limited by the fourth
Supreme Court case, Kuhlmann v. Wilson,4° in which the court permitted
"listening post" informants. The court held, in another six-to-three split
opinion, that a formally charged defendant who is deliberately placed in a
cell with a jailhouse informer "must demonstrate that the police and their
informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed de-
liberately to elicit incriminating remarks" before his sixth amendment right
to counsel is violated.41
In State v. Whittemore42 a Texas court of appeals affirmed a conviction for
aggravated sexual abuse over the appellant's contention that the use of a
cellmate informer violated his sixth amendment right to counsel. The
cellmate testified that Whittemore made an admission of having sex with the
complainant. 43 With no discussion of Maine v. Moulton" the court of ap-
peals held that a statement made to another inmate that was not the result of
"custodial interrogation" is admissible. 45 In Whittemore the cellmate previ-
34. 106 S. Ct. 477, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1986).
35. Id. at 481-82, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 489. The idea of killing a witness was discussed briefly
and dismissed. Id. at 482, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 488.
36. Id. at 490, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 498-99. "Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel
granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to
the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him." Id. at 484, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 492 (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)).
37. Id. at 484 n.7, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496 n.7.
38. Id. at 485, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 496.
39. Id. at 489, 88 L. Ed. 2d at 498-99.
40. 106 S. Ct. 2616, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986).
41. Id. at 2630, 91 L.Ed. at 384-85. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, noted that
the constitutional underpinnings of Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1986),
United States v. Henry, 477 U.S. 264 (1980), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1963), were concerned with secret interrogation by investigatory techniques equivalent to di-
rect police questioning, not the opportunistic overhearing by an informant of the accused's
incriminating statements. 106 S. Ct. at 2629, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 384.
42. 712 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no pet.).
43. Id. at 608.
44. 106 S. Ct. 477, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1986).
45. 712 S.W.2d at 607.
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ously had worked as an agent for law enforcement in a drug deal, but was no
longer acting in such capacity when Whittemore made the statement. 46
B. Right to Self-Representation
The right of an accused to self-representation was recognized in Faretta v.
California.47 The court held this right applied to appeals in Webb v. State.48
These opinions set the stage for the appellant's attempts to represent herself
on appeal in Gelabert v. State.49 Gelabert originally requested that court-
appointed counsel be removed and reluctantly volunteered to represent her-
self on appeal if she could not find adequate counsel.50 After the trial court
granted the request, the court of appeals remanded for a hearing to deter-
mine if Gelabert unconditionally waived counsel. 51 Gelabert then reasserted
her desire to represent herself, but cited McKaskle v. Wiggins 52 for the ap-
pointment of standby counsel. The court of appeals next held that Gelabert
had not unconditionally waived her constitutional right to counsel on appeal
and abated the appeal for the appointment of counsel. 53 After the appoint-
ment of counsel appellant continued to assert her right to self-representation
by filing two more pro se motions for self-representation and caused court-
appointed counsel to do the same. 54 The court of appeals held that Gelabert
intended the motions to obstruct the orderly procedure of the court and to
interfere with the fair representation of justice. 55 While the procedural bat-
tles were raging, both appellant and her court-appointed counsel filed appel-
late briefs. 56 The court of appeals based its decision that appellant could not
represent herself on her earlier request for standby counsel. 57 Appellant
finally won the battle to represent herself" when the court of appeals
adopted the reasoning of another court of appeals in Saunders v. State 59 and
held that appellant's request for standby counsel did not make her request
for self-representation invalid.6°
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
The factual circumstances in Nix v. Whiteside6l seemed derived from a
46. Id.
47. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975); see U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV.
48. 533 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
49. 712 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
50. Id. at 815.
51. Id.
52. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).





58. She lost the war when the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Id. at 818.
59. 721 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no pet.). Saunders noted that the court of
criminal appeals had not clearly interpreted Faretta, and then concluded that under Faretta, a
judge may not deny a defendant's demand for self-representation simply because the record
does not establish a valid waiver of counsel. Id. at 363.
60. Id.
61. 106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986).
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law school ethics exam. Whiteside, charged with murder, consistently told
his appointed counsel that although he never saw a gun in the victim's hand,
Whiteside was sure the victim had a gun before he stabbed the victim. 62
Shortly before trial Whiteside told his counsel that he was going to testify
that the victim had a metallic object in his hand.63 Counsel told the accused
that only a reasonable belief of the existence of a gun was necessary to estab-
lish a self-defense claim. 64 He also told Whiteside that if Whiteside persisted
in committing the perjury, he would be required to advise the court of the
perjury and would seek to withdraw.65 Whiteside subsequently testified as
to his first version of the facts and was convicted. 66 Whiteside filed a motion
for new trial alleging that his counsel's actions deprived him of a fair trial.67
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.68 The federal district
court affirmed the federal writ of habeas corpus.69 The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed. 70 The court reasoned that an intent to commit
perjury, communicated to counsel, does not alter a defendant's right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 71 Counsel's admonition that he would inform the
court of Whiteside's perjury attempt, therefore, constituted a threat to vio-
late the attorney's duty to preserve client confidences, breaching the stan-
dards of effective representation. 72 Chief Justice Burger wrote the
unanimous opinion of the Court, reversing the Eighth Circuit and affirming
the judgment of conviction. Utilizing accepted standards of ethical con-
duct,73 the Court found no failure by trial counsel to adhere to reasonable
professional standards that would deprive the client of the sixth amendment
right to counsel.74 In applying the Strickland standard, 75 therefore, counsel
breached no recognized professional duty and nothing indicated that, but for
62. Id. at 989, 898 L. Ed. 2d at 130-31.
63. Id.
64. Counsel testified at the writ of habeas corpus hearing that, as officers of the court, they




68. State v. Whiteside, 273 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
69. 106 S. Ct. at 992, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 132.
70. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 1329.
72. Id. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a
defendant must show that the attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of rea-
sonably professional judgment, Id. at 690, and the existence of a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's deficient performance, the proceeding would have led to a different result. Id.
at 694. The Court defined reasonable probability as a "probablity sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the outcome." Id. at 698; see Keck, Criminal Procedure: Trial and Appeal, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 393 Sw. L.J. 495, 497-99 (1985) [hereinafter Keck, 1985 Annual Survey].
73. 106 S. Ct. at 996, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 135-37. Citing the American Bar Association's
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (1980) and the more recent
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983), the Chief Justice wrote that the
ethical standards do not merely authorize disclosure of client perjury, the rules require such
disclosure. Id. at 995, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 135. The rules also permit withdrawal as an appropriate
remedy when the client attempts to commit perjury. Id. at 996, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 136.
74. 106 S. Ct. at 997, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 140.
75. See supra note 72.
[Vol. 41
1987] CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPEAL 535
counsel's conduct, the results of the proceeding would have been different.7 6
Four members of the Court concurred in the judgment, three of them writ-
ing opinions. 77 Each opinion firmly stated that the Chief Justice's opinion
had not established a national code of legal ethics. 78 The concurring opinion
of Justice Blackmun noted that Whiteside involved a case in which the ac-
cused specifically stated his intent to commit perjury as opposed to a case in
which counsel did not believe his client. 79
As noted above in Strickland v. Washington,80 the Supreme Court estab-
lished a two-part test to determine the effectiveness of counsel.8' The test
essentially requires that counsel's representation fall below any objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel's deficient performance,
the proceeding would have led to a different result.8 2 The Texas test prior to
Strickland required "reasonably effective assistance."'8 3 As noted in previous
Survey articles, this test established a substantial barrier for any convicted
defendant.8 4
Notwithstanding the Strickland barrier, counsel who fails to conduct an
independent investigation of the facts of the case will be deemed deficient.
In Butler v. State85 counsel presented the defenses of alibi and mistaken
identification. 86 Besides the defendant, counsel called only one witness to
support the alibi defense and no eyewitnesses to contradict the complainant's
identification.8 7 Since witnesses were available on each issue, the court held
76. 106 S. Ct. at 997, 999, 89 L. Ed. 2d 134, 140-41.
77. Justice Blackman filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id. at 1000-07, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 141-49. Justices Brennan
and Stevens also wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. at 1000, 1007, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 141,
149-50.
78. Justice Blackman noted that under Strickland a court reviewing the effectiveness of
counsel should first determine if the accused has been harmed before delving into counsel's
performance. Id. at 1003, 89 L. Ed. 2d. at 143-44. Blackmun suggested three factors to con-
sider when evaluating whether an attorney's response to what he sees as a client's plan to
commit pejury violates a defendant's sixth amendment rights: (1) the attorney's degree of
certainty that the proposed testimony is false, (2) the state of the proceedings at which the
attorney discovers the plan, and (3) alternative ways the attorney may dissuade his client.
Based on the complex interaction of variable factors, a blanket rule that defense attorneys must
reveal, or threaten to reveal, a client's anticipated perjury to the court is inappropriate. Id. at
1006, 89 L. Ed. at 149.
79. Id. at 991, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 130=; see United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555
F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), in which counsel violated her client's right to counsel by informing
the court that she believed her client intended to commit pejury and threatened to withdraw
in the middle of trial, both of which caused the client not to take the stand. The opinion held
that attorneys who adopt "the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts," can create a
situation in which the accused is deprived of the loyal and zealous advocacy required by the
sixth amendment. Id. at 122.
80. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
81. The sixth amendment's right to counsel means the right to the "effective assistance of
counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
82. For a discussion of the Strickland standard see supra note 72.
83. Exparte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
84. See Keck & Johnson, Criminal Procedures: Trial and Appeal, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 583, 589 (1986) [hereinafter Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey]; Keck,
1985 Annual Survey, supra note 72, at 497-99 (1985).
85. 716 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Crim. App, 1986) (en banc).
86. Id. at 54.
87. Id. at 55.
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that counsel's failure to conduct properly a pre-trial investigation constituted
deficient performance under the first part of the Strickland test.8 8 The ap-
pellant's conviction was based solely on the testimony of one eyewitness and
the testimony that the jury did not hear consisted of the testimony of two
witnesses who said someone other than the appellant committed the robbery,
and of a third witness who established the appellant's alibi. The court found
the facts "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome" 89 and affirmed
the court of appeals' reversal of the conviction.90 The court of criminal
appeals limited the opinion to the sixth amendment issues of Strickland and
did not address the right to counsel provisions of article I, sections 19 and 10
of the Texas Constitution. 91
The appellant in Garcia v. State92 contended that the trial court erred in
admitting prejudicial testimony that was corroborative of the complaining
witness.93 The court rejected these grounds, because the appellant had failed
to preserve error properly by a timely trial objection.94 The court of appeals,
however, held that the failure to preserve error was deficient conduct that
had an adverse effect upon the defense and reversed the conviction.95 The
same panel of the El Paso court of appeals that decided Garcia applied the
Strickland standard in Majid v. State,96 but held that counsel's negligence in
failing to listen to all of a taped inculpatory conversation was an isolated
failure that did not present a reasonable probability of a different result had
it not occurred. 97 Two cases have addressed the issue of whether the failure
to object to improper evidence was evidence of deficient performance. In
Walston v. State9 8 the court of appeals held that defense counsel's failure to
object to certain inadmissible evidence was not by itself an indication of inef-
fective assistance of counsel and affirmed the conviction.99 The opinion rea-
88. Id. An attorney must acquaint himself with both the law and the facts of a case. An
attorney must also fulfill his duty to investigators, associates, and prosecuting attorneys. 716
S.W.2d at 55-56.
89. See supra note 72.
90. 716 S.W.2d at 56. The court of appeals decision was unpublished. See Butler v. State,
No. 3-83-133-CR (Tex. App.-Austin, May 9, 1984, no pet.).
91. 716 S.W.2d at 57 n.2. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have.., the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or both
.Id. § 19 provides: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property,
privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law
of the land."
92. 712 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.).
93. The court had permitted a police officer to testify that in his opinion the complainant
child's demeanor indicated that the child was telling the truth. Id. at 251. A supervisor for
the sexual abuse unit of the department of human resources testified that she had never ob-
served a mother try to get a child to lie fater being sexually abused, which testimony rebutted
the defensive theory. Id. at 251-52.
94. Id. at 251-52.
95. Id. at 252; see Crockett v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1986), in which the court
held that counsel's failure to object to inadmissible prior convictions constituted deficient per-
formance, but the defendant was not able to show with reasonable probability that the result
would have been different. Id. at 793.
96. 713 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.).
97. Id. at 414.
98. 697 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, pet. ref'd).
99. Id. at 519.
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soned that counsel's failure to object could be justified as an attempt to
minimize the risk of further incriminating evidence.'°° In Lyons v. McCot-
ter 10 the federal circuit court of appeals agreed that although counsel could
strategically choose not to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence
that was arguably inadmissible, no good reason existed for not objecting to
the admission of prejudicial evidence that was clearly inadmissible. 0 2
A federal habeas corpus proceeding involving a Texas state prisoner em-
phasized the problem that a defendant faces. In Martin v. McCotter 10 3 the
defendant received a life sentence for aggravated robbery.°4 Numerous de-
fense witnesses testified about the defendant's good character and supported
his alibi defense during the guilt or innocence stage of the proceedings.' 0 5
The defendant's counsel presented no evidence at the sentencing phase of the
trial.' 0 6 After the prosecution made an opening argument at sentencing, de-
fense counsel announced that the defense would present no argument. 10 7
Martin, the defendant, subsequently was sentenced to life and ultimately
brought the habeaus corpus action, contending that he was deprived of his
right to effective counsel. 10 8 The circuit court affirmed, concluding first that
the decision to forgo argument did not constitute constructive denial of
counsel that would render a showing of Strickland prejudice unnecessary' 0 9
and second that counsel's silence did not harm the defendant because the
facts of the case warranted a life sentence. 10
The defendant's own actions also may negate the errors of his counsel. In
Duncan v. State"'I the appellant complained that his trial counsel failed to
100. Id.
101. 770 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 534.
103. 796 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 815-16.
105. Id. at 816.
106. Id. at 817. At the federal evidentiary hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, testimony
was presented that numerous witnesses existed who were ready to testify as to the defendant's
character, but counsel saw no need to present additional evidence since many of the defend-
ant's positive character traits had been presented during the guilt state of the trial. Id.
107. Id. at 819. By a footnote the opinion detailed counsel's reasoning for waiving argu-
ment. First, counsel claimed that defendant had refused to display remorse and did not want
to "crawl" to the jury. Second, counsel believed that the jury disliked, disbelieved, and dis-
trusted the defendant and counsel did not want to aggravate the jury by arguing positive traits
when the jury was already mad. Third, counsel did not want to act as a "foil" for the prosecu-
tion's rebuttal argument. Id. at 821 n.2.
108. Id. at 816, 819-21.
109. Id. at 820. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that some instances exist in which counsel's actions or inactions are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified. If, therefore,
counsel is denied at a critical stage of the proceedings (the Maine v. Moulton situation, see
supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text), if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's
case to meaningful adversarial testing, or if an actual conflict of interest exists, prejudice is
presumed. Id. at 659, 662 n.31.
110. 796 F.2d at 821. Other circuit court opinions have discussed the silent counsel issue.
Compare Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d 622, 625 (11 th Cir: 1985) (circuit court refused to presume
prejudice when counsel had been silent during guilt or innocence stage) with Martin v. Rose,
744 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1984) (prejudice presumed when counsel refused to partici-
pate in any aspect of trial).
111. 717 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
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object to the admissibility of oral statements and failed to present an alibi or
any other defense. 112 The court of criminal appeals affirmed by holding that
the appellant waived the error when he, of his own accord and against coun-
sel's advice, took the stand at the punishment stage and made a judicial con-
fession. 113 The court applied the Strickland test and held that a defendant
cannot make a claim of ineffectiveness when the defendant preempts his at-
torney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed.114
The difficulty that counsel faces in trying to maintain effectiveness is
demonstrated in Barnsworth v. State, 1 5 in which counsel permitted the trial
court to convince him that the law on a certain issue was settled, whereas the
law subsequently changed. The appellants were charged with aggravated
robbery, pleaded guilty, and sought probation from the jury.' 16 The trial
court, relying on a court of appeals decision, 1 7 held that a jury had no au-
thority to recommend probation in an aggravated robbery case. A court of
criminal appeals' decision, however, ultimately disapproved the decision re-
lied on by the trial court. 118 In analyzing the case on the totality of the
circumstances, the Barnsworth court held that the failure of counsel to re-
quest a charge on probation or to object to the change on the ground that it
did not contain a charge on probation deprived the defendants of reasonably
effective assistance of counsel.' 19
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due to Conflict
In Lerma v. State,120 subject to review during the last Survey,' 2 ' the court
held that the failure of the accused or counsel to raise the issue of conflict of
interest during the trial waives the error. 122 In Deloro v. State 12 3 the defend-
ant was charged with theft in two separate cases. The defendant used three
separate checks to pay his attorneys, who endorsed the checks and deposited
them. 124 The complainant allegedly gave the checks, which were the basis of
112. Id. at 346.
113. Id. at 347 (citing Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).
114. Id. at 347-48.
115. 698 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, pet. ref'd).
116. Id. at 688.
117. Rivas v. State, 627 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, pet. ref'd).
118. May v. State, 722 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); see Keck & Johnson, 1986
Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 591-93.
119. 698 S.W.2d at 690.
120. 679 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (opinion on state's motion for rehearing).
121. See Keck & Johnson 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 597-98.
122. In Lerma a counsel represented two co-defendants, one of whom objected at trial to
the joint representation. The other raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Pursuant to
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978), whenever a defendant raises the possibility of
conflicting interests, the trial court has an affirmative duty to assure that the joint representa-
tion does not violate the sixth amendment right to effective counsel and whenever the trial
court improperly requires joint representation over objection, prejudice is presumed and rever-
sal is automatic. Id. If no trial objection is made, however, no presumed harm exists. Culyer
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980). Thus, in Lerma, the defendant who objected received a
reversal while his non-objecting co-defendant's case was affirmed. 679 S.W.2d at 494, 497-98.
123. 712 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
124. Id. at 806-07.
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one of the test cases, to the defendant. 25 The defendant pleaded guilty and
received a ten-year deferred adjudication probation.' 26 Subsequently the
court revoked the defendant's probation, adjudicated him guilty, and sen-
tenced him to prison.' 27 He then filed a motion for a new trial alleging the
conflict caused by his attorneys' endorsements of the stolen checks.' 28 The
court of appeals affirmed, noting that any motion made after the trial had
ended was untimely. 129
In McGuire v. State130 one counsel represented six co-defendants.' 3 '
Prior to trial, on the state's motion, the court held a hearing to determine if
conflicts of interest existed.' 32 Counsel testified that he had explained the
possible conflicts to each defendant and that he was of the opinion that no
conflict existed. ' 33 Each co-defendant also stated that a conflict did not exist
and that each wished to be represented by the same counsel.134 After con-
viction, four of the co-defendants argued that counsel's failure to object to
certain evidence and to request limiting instructions constituted an actual
conflict that deprived each of effective representation.13 5 The court of ap-
peals affirmed, holding that the record did not demonstrate an actual con-
flict, but did show an overall trial strategy to return verdicts of not guilty for
all defendants.' 36 The court wrote that an actual conflict in such situations
arises when one defendant stands to gain significantly by using tactics dam-
aging to the other co-defendant. 137
II. GUILTY PLEAS
During the Survey period Texas courts rendered several opinions concern-
ing the enforcement of plea bargains under the rationale of Santobello v. New
York. 138 In Ex parte Reyna 139 the defendant entered into a plea bargain
with the state whereby he would plead guilty to aggravated robbery and the
prosecution would recommend a sentence of eighteen years to run concur-
rently with a previous sentence in Mississippi. 4° Subsequently the defend-
ant learned that the two sentences were not running concurrently and filed a
writ of habeas corpus. 14 ' The court of criminal appeals held that the plea




129. Id. at 809. The court did state that the issue could be raised by a post-conviction writ
of habeas corpus. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
130. 707 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd, untimely filed).




135. Id. at 226-29.
136. Id. at 229-30.
137. Id. at 229 (citing Gonzales v. State, 605 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
138. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). When a prosecutor's promise induces a guilty plea, such promise
must be fulfilled. Id. at 263.
139. 707 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Crim, App. 1986) (en banc).
140. Id. at 110-11.
141. Id. at 111.
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bargain was unenforceable and that the defendant was entitled to withdraw
his plea of guilty. 142
In Thi Van Le v. Perkins143 the defendant pleaded guilty to a murder
charge in exchange for a recommended maximum sentence of twenty-five
years. 144 An explicit understanding existed that the trial court could give a
lesser sentence after examining the presentence report. 145 After studying the
presentence report the trial court struck the plea bargain, stating that the
court had accepted it based upon a mistaken belief as to the defendant's
complicity. 146 The defendant then filed an application for mandamus, de-
manding specific performance of the plea bargain agreement. 147 The Austin
court of appeals held that the trial judge bound himself to assess punishment
at imprisonment for no more than twenty-five years when he unconditionally
accepted the plea bargain agreement.148 The court of appeals then held that
an appellate court may direct a trial court by mandamus to enter a particular
judgment if it is the only proper judgment that can be rendered in the cir-
cumstances. 149 The court further found that the defendant had no other
adequate remedy other than specific performance of the plea bargain.' 50
Whether or not Thi Van Le withstands review by the court of criminal
appeals,' 5 ' certain portions of the opinion are noteworthy. First, the case
specifically held that "where the plea of guilty is voluntarily made and spe-
cific performance is practical, specific performance is the preferred remedy
when the plea bargain agreement is breached."' 52 Second, the case specifi-
cally held that once the trial court accepts the plea bargain, the trial court is
bound.' 53 This second holding needs to be compared with West v. State,' 54
in which the court of criminal appeals reached a different result as to the
finality of the plea proceeding. In West the defendant pleaded guilty before
the court with no plea bargain to the offense of aggravated rape.' 55 Before
the entry of the plea counsel filed an application for probation. 56 After
142. Id. See also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
143. 700 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App.-Austin 1985, no pet.).
144. Id. at 770-72.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 773.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 775.
149. Id. 775-76 (citing Thomason v. Seale, 122 Tex. 160, 53 S.W.2d 764 (1932); Vance v.
Routt, 572 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); and 373 TEX. Jun. 2D Mandamus § 48
(1962)). Two requirements necessary to issue a writ of mandamus are: (1) the act sought to be
compelled is ministerial as distinguished from discretionary, and (2) the petitioner has no other
adequate remedy at law. Ordunez v. Bean, 579 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
150. 700 S.W.2d at 776.
151. The trial court and the prosecutor's office filed a motion for leave to file a mandamus
action against the court of appeals, contending that the court of appeals' mandamus is im-
proper, both prosedurally and substantively. See Perkins v. Court of Appeals, 706 S.W.2d 320,
321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
152. 700 S.W.2d at 774 (citing McFadden v. State, 544 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976).
153. 700 S.W.2d at 774.
154. 702 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
155. Id.. at 631.
156. Id.
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pleading guilty evidence was presented on the issue of probation.1 57 The
court found the defendant guilty and ordered a presentence investigation.15 8
When the proceedings resumed, more evidence was offered and defense
counsel argued for deferred adjudication.1 59 After the trial court assessed a
twenty-five year sentence the defendant's counsel filed an appeal claiming
that the plea of guilty was involuntary because defense counsel had incor-
rectly advised the defendant that he was eligible for probation. 16° The ulti-
mate issue, therefore, became whether the trial court's finding of guilt
precluded the trial court's consideration of deferred adjudication, since that
was the only probation for which the defendant was eligible. 161 The court of
criminal appeals held that, since the trial judge did not enter a written judg-
ment until the day he assessed the sentence, his oral finding of guilt on the
day the defendant pleaded did not divest the court of the power to grant
deferred adjudication. 1 62 Thus, if the West opinion is applied to the Thi Van
Le factual situation, the plea bargain would not be binding until the written
judgment is entered. 163
The circumstances in Ex parte Adams 164 showed that a defendant should
not surmise that a plea bargain continues from one plea to another. Adams
originally pleaded guilty and was given a forty-year sentence with an agree-
ment that if the co-defendants got less time, he would be brought back and
given the same sentence as the co-defendants.1 65 Subsequently the court
granted a motion for new trial, and appellant pleaded guilty in return for an
agreed sentence of twenty-five years incarceration. 166 Adams surmised that
the offer from the first plea to limit his sentence to those of the co-defendants
carried over because his counsel stated: "I wasn't going to let you get the
bad end of the deal."' 67 After the co-defendants received probated sentences
Adams brought a writ of habeaus corpus to enforce the plea bargain he
thought existed, forming the issue as a deprivation of his right to effective
assistance of counsel.' 68 The court of criminal appeals rejected the conten-
tion and held that an accused cannot surmise as to the contents of a plea
bargain. 169
The mixture of two lines of cases resulted in the recognition of new law in
157. Id.
158. Id. at 632.
159. Id. Deferred adjudication is a form of sentence in which the defendant is placed on
probation but not formally found guilty. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 3d
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
160. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(l)(C) (Vernon Supp. 1987),
which excludes probation as a possible punishment for aggravated sexual assault.
161. 702 S.W.2d at 634.
162. Id.
163. See Ex parte Williams, 637 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc) (agreement
held to be operative when court announces it will accept agreement), cent denied, 462 U.S.
1108 (1982).
164. 707 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
165. Id. at 647.
166. Id.




Shannon v. State.170 Shannon originally had been charged with delivery of
over 400 grams of diazepam, but pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of
possession of over 400 grams of the controlled substance, with the prosecu-
tion recommending a two-year sentence. 171 Later the court in Ex parte
Crisp 172 held that the controlled substance law upon which the prosecution
and plea were based was unconstitutional. 173 The court of appeals in an
unpublished opinion 174 reversed the conviction and remanded the case for
reassessment of punishment only. 175 The state sought review to determine
what the appropriate remedy should be for an unenforceable plea bargain. 176
The court of appeals, in holding that appellant was entitled to resentencing,
relied on precedent establishing that when an error relates to punishment
only and the punishment was assessed by the court, a defendant is entitled to
resentencing and not a retrial. 177 The court of criminal appeals noted that in
applying the above principle of law, the opinions had never differentiated
negotiated guilty pleas from not guilty pleas or unnegotiated guilty pleas. 178
The court of criminal appeals then held that the general principle would not
apply in negotiated plea cases, but that henceforth, when a defendant suc-
cessfully challenged a plea bargained conviction, the appropriate remedy is
specific performance of the plea if possible. If such specific performance is
not possible, the proper remedy is withdrawal of the plea, with both parties
returning to their original position. 179
As noted in the last Survey, 180 Morgan v. State 181 radically altered prior
law concerning the appeal of pretrial rulings in cases in which the defendant
pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain. Prior to Morgan the law had long
been that a person could not appeal an adverse ruling on a pretrial matter if
170. 708 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
171. Id. at 851.
172. 643 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. App.-Austin), aff'd, 661 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983)(en banc).
173. Id. at 492. Crisp held that the statute creating the amendments to the law was uncon-
stitutional because of a defect in the title of the bill. Rather than dismissing the cause, how-
ever, the case held that the law in effect before the amendment was passed was still in effect.
Id. As relevant to Shannon, before the amendment possession of diazepam was punishable as
a misdemeanor, but delivery was punishable as a felony.
174. Shannon v. State, No. 05-83-00191-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas, Jan. 30, 1984) (unpub-
lished opinion).
175. 708 S.W.2d at 851.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 851-52.
178. Id. at 852.
179. Id. Judge Clinton dissented, noting that the state did not have the constitutional right
to be returned to its original position if the plea bargain failed. Id. at 853. He stressed that the
principle benefit to the state in a plea bargain was the waiver of the jury trial. The state had no
right to contest any sentence the court gave. Id. He also noted that even if the state elected to
prosecute the defendant on the felony delivery charge, the punishment would still be limited to
two years under the rational of Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). 708 S.W.2d at 854.
Blackledge held that the trial court cannot generally assess a greater punishment on a retrial
after the defendant successfully appeals except for identifiable conduct occurring after the orig-
inal sentence. 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974).
180. See Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 608-09.
181. 656 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983), remanded, 688 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
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he pleaded guilty to the offense, since the plea waived all nonjurisdictional
defects.' 8 2 The legislature amended article 44.02 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure to permit a defendant who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere pur-
suant to a plea bargain to appeal the pretrial rulings of the court.18 3 None-
theless, if the accused entered a judicial confession when making the plea of
guilty, he still could not appeal pretrial decisions, since the judicial confes-
sion was held to waive all nonjurisdictional errors.18 4 The appellate courts
then became clogged with cases in which the defendant had been advised he
could appeal otherwise preserved pretrial issues, but whose convictions were
affirmed because of the procedure used to plead guilty in plea bargain
cases. 1 85 In most of these cases, the court held the plea to be involuntary,
thus permitting the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty and plead
anew. 1 86 In Morgan the court of criminal appeals held that article 44.02
allowed appellate review on the merits of the appeal even if the defendant
pleaded guilty and made a judicial confession.18 7 The foregoing brings us to
Ex parte Stansberg,18 8 in which the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a
plea bargain and attempted to appeal a search issue. His original appeal was
affirmed in an unreported per curiam decision because the judicial confession
negated the search issue. 189 Stansberg then filed a writ of habeas corpus
alleging that his plea was involuntary. The court of criminal appeals first
granted the writ, which would have permitted Stansberg to withdraw his
plea. After the state filed a motion for rehearing, however, the court decided
Morgan. On the motion for rehearing, the court, rather than allowing the
defendant to withdraw his appeal, considered the original appeal on the mer-
its. 190 The writ of habeas corpus, therefore, was transformed into the origi-
nal appeal, which was affirmed. 19 1 The court of criminal appeals also
stressed in Moraquez v. State 192 that the Morgan rules do not apply to jury
trials in which the plea was not guilty or the plea was guilty but no plea
bargain existed. 3
During the Survey period the courts decided several cases concerning the
admonishments required before a defendant could make a plea of guilty. In
Ex parte Williams 194 the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court
does not have the duty to admonish the defendant on the availability of pro-
182. For a discussion of the prior law see Presiding Judge Onion's dissent. 688 S.W.2d at
511.
183. TEX. CODE. CRIM. Paoc. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
184. Haney v. State, 588 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
185. See Mooney v. State, 615 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Wooten v. State,
612 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
186. See Mooney, 615 S.W.2d at 778; Wooten, 612 S.W.2d at 564.
187. 688 S.W.2d at 507.
188. 702 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
189. Id. at 644.
190. Id. at 645.
191. Id. at 645-49.
192. 701 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
193. Id. at 905.
194. 692 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), rel. granted, 704 S.W.2d
773 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
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bation. 195 If the judge, however, undertakes to explain the law of probation,
the court must provide accurate information. 196 Further, if the trial court
provides inaccurate information misleading to the defendant, he is entitled to
withdraw his plea. 197 In Johnson v. State 198 the court held that the failure to
admonish on the limited right of appeal is of no consequence.199 In Gonzales
v. State,2° ° however, the failure to admonish as to the range of punishment
constituted reversible error.20 1
Another "range of punishment" case could have far-reaching impact. In
McMillan v. State202 the court convicted the defendant of the misdemeanor
offense of driving while intoxicated. Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provides that before a court may accept a plea of guilty, it must
give the accused certain admonishments, including the range of punish-
ment.203 The statute does not apply, however, in misdemeanor cases.2°4
The Dallas court of appeals held that due process of law required that an
affirmative showing must exist in the record that the accused knew the range
of punishment applicable in misdemeanor cases in which imprisonment can
be imposed.20 5
III. JURY TRIAL ISSUES
A. Batson v. Kentucky
Although disclaiming any intention of announcing a new principle of sub-
stantive constitutional law, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky20 6
moved strongly to ensure jury participation for racial minorities. In 1965
the Supreme Court held in Swain v. Alabama 20 7 that a prosecutor's deliber-
ate exclusion of jurors on account of race violated the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution.208 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed
the lower court decision because, even though the prosecutor struck all of
the black persons on the jury, Swain had not proved "purposeful discrimina-
tion."1209 Lower courts applying Swain held that proof of repeated striking
of minorities over a number of cases would be required to show a constitu-
195. 704 S.W.2d at 776.
196. Id. at 776-77.
197. Id. at 777-78.
198. 712 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
199. Id. at 568.
200. 712 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
201. Id. at 835 (citing McDade v. State, 562 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). In
Gonzalez the court advised the defendant of the penalty range after the plea was taken. If the
trial court had offered to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea at that time, no harm would
have been shown. See Hardman v. State, 614 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
202. 703 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
203. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
204. 703 S.W.2d at 343 (citing McGuire v. State, 617 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).
205. 703 S.W.2d at 344. The opinion was based on both the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and art. 1, § 19 of the Texas Constitution. Id. at 345.
206. 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
207. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
208. Id. at 226-27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[N]or shall any State...
deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws."
209. 380 U.S. at 222-24.
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tional violation.2 1 0 Batson rejected that interpretation of Swain as placing an
impossible burden on the defendant.2 1 1 The Court stated a new procedure in
which the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group and that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove
members of that group from the jury.2 12 The defendant may rely on the fact
that the use of peremptory challenges to select a jury permits discrimination
by those who wish to discriminate.2 1 3 Finally, the defendant must show that
the exclusion of minorities and other relevant circumstances raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude venireper-
sons on account of their race.21 4  If the defendant makes a prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward with a neutral
explanation.2 15
After deciding Batson the Court was quick to determine the issue of retro-
activity, granting oral arguments for the 1986 term on whether Batson
should be given retroactive effect in cases pending on direct appeal.21 6 The
Court also rendered a per curiam opinion in Allen v. Hardy,2 1 7 which held
that Batson would not be given retroactive application on collateral review of
convictions that became final before April 30, 1986, the date Batson was
announced.2 18 The Fifth Circuit held in Esquivel v. McCotter2 19 that Batson
would be given prospective application only in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.220
At least one Texas appellate court considered the Batson issue during the
Survey period. In Williams v. State2 2  a court of appeals held that the de-
fendant waived the error by not objecting to the state's peremptory strikes
after the state had exercised them or to the composition of the jury after the
parties had selected it.222 The proper time to raise the issue was after the
210. 106 S. Ct. at 1720 n.16, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 84-85 n.16.
211. Id. at 1720-21, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 84-85.
212. Id. at 1723, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87.
213. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953)).
214. Id., 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88. Illustrative examples were given: "For example, a 'pattern'
of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference
of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire exami-
nation and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory
purpose." Id.
215. Id., 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88. The Court emphasized that although the reason does not rise
to the level of a challenge for cause, it may not be based on the assumption or intuitive judg-
ment that the person challenged would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race.
Id.
216. See Brown v.United States, 106 S. Ct. 2275, 90 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1986); Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, 106 S. Ct. 2274, 90 L. Ed. 2d 717-18 (1986).
217. 106 S. Ct. 2878, 92 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1986).
218. Id. at 2881, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 205-06. The Court defined "final" to mean "where the
judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for
petition for certiorari had elapsed." Id. at 2880 n.1, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 204 n.l.
219. 791 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1986).
220. Id. at 352-53. In Esquivel the federal district court had stayed the defendant's execu-
tion pending a hearing on the Batson issue. The circuit court vacated the lower court's order.
Id. at 353.
221. 712 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-Corpur Christi 1986, no pet.).
222. Id. at 840.
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preemptory strikes were recorded but before the jury was sworn. 223 The
court also discussed the issue on the merits and held that the defendant did
not raise a prima facie case of discrimination. 224 The court noted that the
prosecutor only struck two of the three blacks on the jury panel, that both
the victim and the defendant were black, and that the racial composition of
the jury was almost identical to the racial composition of the county. 225
B. Jury Selection in Capital Cases
The Supreme Court removed one of the last two major issues left in capi-
tal cases in Lockhart v. McCree.226 The state charged and convicted McCree
of capital felony murder but sentenced him to life imprisonment. McCree
sought federal habeas corpus relief, contending that the "death qualifica-
tion" process of removing those jurors who could not assess the death pen-
alty violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to have guilt
determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross-section
of the community. 227 In effect, McCree contended, the Witherspoon 228 jury
selection process created a guilty prone jury. The federal district court229
and circuit court of appeals230 found in the petitioner's favor. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts, holding that despite data indicating that the
"death qualification" of juries produces juries more prone to convict, the
constitution does not prohibit removing prospective jurors whose beliefs re-
garding the death penalty would substantially impair or prevent the per-
223. Id.
224. Id. at 841.
225. Id. at 842. The court of appeals did note that not all of the minorities need be struck,
but that the striking of a disproportionate number so as to render minority representation
impotent could be enough to make the prima facia showing. Id. at 841. The court also deline-
ated four factors derived from People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 280-81, 583 P.2d 748, 764
(Cal. 1978), in evaluating Batson claims:
1) whether the state struck all or most of the group members or used a dispro-
portionate number of its strikes against group members; 2) whether the struck
jurors shared only one characteristic (group membership) and were otherwise
heterogeneous; 3) whether the prosecutor had engaged the struck jurors in
'more than desultory voir dire,' or had even questioned them at all; and
4) whether the crime involved was interracial.
Williams, 712 S.W.2d at 841-42.
226. 106 S. Ct. 1758, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986). The issue still remaining concerns the
constitutionality of the death penalty practice, with opponents of the death penalty contending
that capital cases in which the victim is Caucasian result in an abnormally higher percentage of
death sentences than if the victim is non-Caucasian. See Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct.
288, 90 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1986) (granting petition); McClesky v. Kemp, 106 S. Ct. 1331, 92 L.
Ed. 2d 737 (1986) (granting petition). Both cases were argued before the Court on October 15,
1986. See Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4062 (Oct. 22, 1986); McClesky
v. Kemp, 40 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 4061 (Oct. 22, 1986).
227. 106 S. Ct. at 1761, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 143-44.
228. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which held that a prospective juror
could not be excluded for cause if the juror generally opposed the death penalty, but could be if
the juror made it unmistakably clear that he/she would automatically vote against capital
punishment without regard to the evidence or that the juror's belief concerning capital punish-
ment "would prevent [a juror] from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt."
Id. at 522-23 n.21 (emphasis in original).
229. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
230. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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formance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing stage of the trial.23'
In prior cases involving victims and defendants of different races, the
Court had refused to adopt a per se rule permitting the defense to insist that
jurors be questioned about racial bias.232 In Turner v. Murray,2 33 however,
the Court decided that the rules are different if the crime is a capital offense.
In such cases the accused has a constitutional right 234 to have prospective
jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial
bias upon request.235 The decision effectively created a per se rule for capital
cases instead of the fact-finding required in noncapital cases. 236 The Court,
however, did not reverse the conviction. Instead the Court remanded the
cause for a new sentencing hearing, because the Court held that racial
prejudices were less likely to affect a guilt determination, which is less
subjective. 237
C. Jury Selection in General
Statutes requiring that jurors speak and understand English and that a
jury be composed wholly of United States citizens withstood constitutional
attack in Acen v. Massachusetts.238 The defendant argued that the statutes
violated the sixth amendment's fair cross-section requirement 239 and the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 24° The Court, however, re-
jected the arguments by dismissing the appeal for want of a substantial fed-
eral question.241
Attempts by trial courts to put time limits on voir dire examination con-
231. 106 S. Ct. at 1770, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 154-55. The opinion held that the fair cross-section
requirements apply to jury panels or venires, and not to the jury actually chosen to hear the
case. Id. at 1766, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 149. As to McCree's argument that because all jurors are
predisposed towards one result or another a constitutionally impartial jury may only be ac-
quired by balancing the various predispositions of the individual jurors, the Court held that an
impartial jury consists only of jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.
Id. at 1770, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 154-5.
232. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976), and Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524
(1973), in which the request for voir dire on racial bias must be honored only if the facts
indicated a significant likelihood that, without such questioning, a biased jury might be se-
lected. 424 U.S. at 596; 409 U.S. at 527. The opinions also noted that difference in race
between accused and victim alone would not constitute a special circumstance. 424 U.S. at
597; 409 U.S. at 526-27.
233. 106 S. Ct. at 1683, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27 (1986).
234. The constitutional right to an impartial jury pursuant to the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 1688 n.9, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 36-37 n.9
(citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976).
235. 106 S. Ct. at 1688, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 37.
236. Id. at 1688, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 37.
237. Id. at 1688-89, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 37-38. The opinion's distinction between capital sen-
tencing and fact finding is consistent with the opinion in Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758,
90 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1986). In Witherspoon and Turner, which concerned capital sentencing,
special rules were devised; in McCree, however, no need to fashion special rules existed when
the jury function was the determination of guilt or innocence.
238. 106 S. Ct. 2269, 90 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1986).
239. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . trial, by an
impartial jury..." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
240. Id. amend. XIV § 1.
241. 106 S. Ct. at 2269, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 714.
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tinues to be the subject of appellate review. The court in Sinegal v. State242
summarized the current law governing the defendant who raises the issue on
appeal. The defendant must show: (1) that he did not attempt to prolong
the voir dire examination by asking irrelevant or repetitious questions;
(2) that the questions he sought to ask are set out in a bill of exceptions and
are proper questions; and (3) that he was not permitted to examine panel
members who actually served on the jury.243
The court in Smith v. State244 reversed a murder conviction because the
trial court refused to allow defense counsel to question the venirepersons
concerning the defense of insanity and the purpose of punishment.245 The
opinion held that a question on voir dire is proper if it relates to the ability of
a juror to consider a defense. 246 If the trial court prevents the asking of a
proper question, then the court has prevented the intelligent use of the per-
emptory challenges and created the presumption of harm. 247 In Santana v.
State 248 the court found error when the lower court prevented counsel in a
capital case from voir dire questioning on the lesser included offense of mur-
der, since the defendant would have the right to challenge for cause anyone
who could not consider the minimum punishment for murder.249 Since the
evidence at trial did not raise the issue of the existence of the lesser included
offense, however, no harm was shown. 250
In Bell v. State251 the court of criminal appeals reviewed the steps neces-
sary to preserve jury selection error. First, if the trial court erroneously
overrules a defendant's challenge for cause, the defendant must show: (a) an
exhaustion of his peremptory challenges, (b) a denial of a request for addi-
tional challenges, and (c) the seating of a juror whom the defendant would
have peremptorily struck. Second, if the trial court erroneously grants a
state challenge for cause, thereby excluding a qualified juror, the defendant
242. 712 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no pet.).
243. Id. at 606 (citing Ratliff v. State, 690 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc));
see Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 619.
244. 667 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 703 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
245. 703 S.W.2d at 644-45. The case was cited shortly after John Hinkley's trial for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. See United States v. Hinkley, 672 F.2d 115
(D.C. Cir. 1982). One venireperson specifically referred to Hinkley's case. The defendant
sought to determine what some of the jurors had read about the insanity defense and what
some of the jurors had learned of the case through pretrial publicity. 703 S.W.2d at 644.
246. 703 S.W.2d at 644.
247. Id. at 643 (citing Powell v. State, 631 S.W.2d 169, 169-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982);
Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835,
837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959)).
248. 714 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
249. Id. at 10.
250. Unlike in Smith, the Santana court did not discuss the use of peremptory challenges.
Judge Miller's concurring opinion cautioned trial courts that the appellate distinction between
error and reverseable error should not be a factor in the trial court's decision. He noted that a
proper voir dire question should be allowed regardless of opposing counsel's belief that the
issue will not arise during trial. Id. at 15 (Miller, J., concurring).
251. 707 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc). The opinion was originally pub-
lished in the advance sheets, but was withdrawn from the bound volume of the Southwestern
Reporter because of a late motion for rehearing. See Editor's Note, 707 S.W.2d at 77.
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must show that the state exhausted all of its peremptory challenges. An
exception to this rules exists in capital cases in which the procedure of exer-
cising peremptory challenges after each venireperson is questioned alleviates
this requirement. Third, if the judge sua sponte excuses a juror who is sub-
ject to challenge for cause for a reason that may be waived, 252 the defendant
must object and show harm by proving that he was tried by a jury to which
he had legitimate objection. Fourth, if the judge sua sponte excuses a quali-
fied juror, the defendant must object and show that the state exhausted all of
its peremptory challenges. This rules applies even in capital cases.
IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL
Since no Survey article on the subject of criminal procedure can hope to
discuss all the rulings and other trial procedures, this section will discuss
significant rulings that directly implicate constitutional issues or specific evi-
dentiary rules contained in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The
court of criminal appeals adopted the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence ef-
fective September 1, 1986.253 This Article will not attempt to identify all of
the challenges caused by the new rules of criminal evidence, reserving that
task for another time. The Article, however, will identify several areas in
which the court of criminal appeals acted prematurely 254 and either changed
an evidentiary rule or began using the new rules before the effective date.
A. Confrontation and Impeachment
During the Survey period the Supreme Court decided several cases con-
cerning violation of the confrontation clause255 of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. In Delaware v. Fensterer256 the defendant
was charged with murdering his fiancee by strangling her with a cat leash.
An expert witness testified that hairs found on the leash had come from the
victim and had been forcibly removed from her head, but the witness was
unable to give the basis for his conclusion. The Delaware Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the witness's inability to recall the basis for his opinion
deprived the accused of his sixth amendment confrontation rights.257 The
Supreme Court summarily reversed, stating that the right of confrontation
only guarantees the opportunity for effective cross-examination, and does
252. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(1), (5)-11) (Vernon's Pam. Supp.
1987).
253. VERNON'S TEXAS STATUTES AND CODES ANNOTATED: INTERIM ANNOTATION
SERVICE No. 1, at 386-414 (April 1986); see also TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. (Vernon Pam. 1986).
254. See Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 248-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (Onion, J.,
dissenting): "[T]he majority, in an anticipatory mood, rushes forward to beat any adoption of
the proposed criminal rules of evidence ... and declares that unobjected to hearsay testimony
does have probative value. So much for attempts to gain early credit." For a discussion of
Chambers see infra notes 531-36 and accompanying text.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ..
256. 106 S. Ct. 292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1985).
257. Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d 959 (Del. 1985) rev'd 106 S. Ct. 292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1985).
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not guarantee that the cross-examination would be effective. 25 8 In Delaware
v. Van Arsdall 25 9 the defendant was convicted of murder. The state dropped
unrelated misdemeanor charges against one of the prosecution witnesses in
exchange for his testimony. The trial court prohibited the defense from
cross-examining the witness regarding the bargain. The Delaware Supreme
Court reversed, concluding that a blanket prohibition against exploring the
potential bias of a witness was per se error that precluded any examination
of whether the error actually prejudiced the defendant. 26° The United States
Supreme Court held that although the cutting off of all questions that might
have established bias violated an accused's sixth amendment right to con-
front the witnesses against him, the harmless error analysis established in
Chapman v. California 261 was the proper standard to use in determining if a
reversal was appropriate.262
In an opinion that appears to be contrary to Van Arsdall26 3 the court of
criminal appeals affirmed the aggravated kidnapping conviction in Carmona
v. State 264 in which the trial court refused to permit cross-examination of a
state witness on pending burglary charges. The court held, in a five-to-four
opinion, that the confrontation clause was not offended.265 The court rea-
soned that the defendant had been afforded a thorough and effective cross-
examination and the bias and prejudice of the witness was patently obvious
to the jury.2 6 6
In Lee v. Illinois267 two co-defendants were charged with committing
murder. They were jointly tried and did not testify. The trial court relied on
portions of one co-defendant's confession in order to find the other co-de-
258. 106 S. Ct. at 294-95, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 21.
259. 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986).
260. Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1 (Del. 1984).
261. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (certain constitutional errors may be harmless if reviewing
court may confidently say, on the whole record, that constitutional error was harmless beyond
reasonable doubt).
262. 106 S. Ct. at 1438, 89 L. Ed. at 675.
263. In Van Arsdall, Mr. Justice Rehnquist stated:
In this case, however, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility
that [the witness] would be biased .... By thus cutting off all questioning about
an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might reason-
ably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in
his testimony, the court's ruling violated respondent's rights secured by the
Confrontation Clause.
... We think that a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation
Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropri-
ate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part
of the witness, and thereby "to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors..
could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the wit-
ness." . . . Respondent has met that burden here: A reasonable jury might have
received a significantly different impression of [the witness's] credibility had re-
spondent's counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-
examination.
Id. at 1435-36, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 674 (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
264. 698 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
265. Id. at 104.
266. Id.
267. 106 S. Ct. 2056, 90 L. Ed. 2d 514 (1986).
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fendant, Lee, guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding
that the reliance on the confession violated Lee's right to confrontation. 268
The Court found that the truth-finding function of the confrontation clause
was threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be introduced
against a defendant without the benefit of cross-examination, since such a
confession is hearsay and an accomplice has a strong motive to implicate the
defendant and exonerate himself.269 The opinion held that an accomplice's
confession that incriminates a defendant is presumptively unreliable, and
that the facts surrounding the confession in this case did not bear sufficient
indicia of reliability to rebut the presumption of unreliability.270
In United States v. Inadi271 the Supreme Court held that the confronta-
tion clause did not require a showing of unavailability as a condition to the
admission of out-of-court statements of a nontestifying co-conspirator. 272
Rather, the prosecutor must meet the requirements of rule 801(d)(2)(E)2 73 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.274 This rule is identical to rule 801(e)(2)(E)
of the new Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence. 275
Sanchez v. State 276 is an example of a situation in which the Texas consti-
tution was given a stricter interpretation than the federal Constitution.
Sanchez testified that he killed the deceased because he thought the deceased
was reaching for a weapon. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce
testimony for impeachment purposes that Sanchez neglected to tell the po-
lice this story after arrest. The court of criminal eappeals held that impeach-
ment by silence after arrest was improper under article 1, section 10 of the
Texas Constitution.277 Judge Miller, writing for the court (with one concur-
ring opinion, one judge concurring in the result, and four dissenting judg-
ers), also held that impeachment by post-arrest silence is improper from an
evidentiary standpoint since its meaning is inherently ambiguous as opposed
to clearly contrary to the position later taken at trial. 278
The driving while intoxicated conviction in Hammett v. State279 was re-
versed when the court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant
with a prior criminal mischief conviction. Hammett, when asked on direct:
"Is that the only time you have been arrested for public intoxication?", an-
268. Id. at 2065-66, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 515.
269. Id. at 2063, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 527.
270. Id. at 2063-65, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 527-30.
271. 106 S. Ct. 1121, 89 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1986).
272. Id. at 1122, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 390-91.
273. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if-... (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered
against a party and is... (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and
in furthernace of the conspiracy."
274. 106 S. Ct. at 1123, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 391.
275. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 801(e)(2)(E), supra note 253.
276. 622 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.)--Corpus Christi (1981), rev'd, 707 S.W.2d 575 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
277. 707 S.W.2d at 580. TEX. CONST. art. I. § 10 provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused ... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself ..
278. 707 S.W.2d at 582.
279. 713 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
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swered in the affirmative. 280 The state sought to characterize the question
and answer as insinuating that the defendant had never been in trouble. Af-
ter the court noted the rule "that when an accused testifies gratuitously as to
some matter that is irrelevant or collateral to the proceeding, as with any
other witness he may be impeached by a showing that he has lied or is in
error," 28' the court held that proof of a criminal mischief conviction did not
impeach his statement that the only time he had been convicted for public
intoxication was in January 1983.282
The court of appeals cases concerned the ability of a party to impeach
one's own witness. In Markle v. State 283 the court held that foreknowledge
of a witness's change in testimony precludes impeachment of a witness called
by the party.284 In Pitts v. State285 the defendant established that his own
witness's testimony was unexpected and was injurious to his case, thereby
obtaining a reversal.286 The impeachment of one's own witness is one of the
areas in which the new rules of evidence institute substantive change. Rule
607 now provides that the "credibility of a witness may be attacked by any
party, including the party calling him."'287
B. Extraneous Offenses
One of the most troubling areas facing trial courts concerns the admissi-
bility of extraneous offenses. Although a well-established and fundamental
principal exists that an accused must be tried only for the offense charged
and not for being a criminal generally,288 equally established corollaries to
the general rule exist permitting evidence of extraneous offenses. 289 The ten-
sion between the rule and its many corrollaries leads to the large number of
cases on this subject reaching the appellate courts, and consistency in rulings
is not always the case. The court of criminal appeals in Templin v. State290
stated that the admissibility of evidence as to prior misconduct is not subject
to a definite test; rather the court must balance two variable factors: (1) the
relation of the prior conduct to the alleged offense; and (2) the probative
value of the evidence compared to its prejudicial effect. 291 The two-part
280. Id. at 104.
281. Id. at 105.
282. Id. at 107.
283. 715 S.W.2d 113 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no pet.).
284. Id. at 115.
285. 712 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
286. Id. at 564-65.
287. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 607, supra note 253.
288. See Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc); Albrecht v.
State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); 3 R. RAY., TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 1521
(Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980).
289. See Plante v. State, 674 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 692 S.W.2d 487
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
290. 677 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1983), rev'd, 711 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
291. 711 S.W.2d at 33 (citing Plante v. State, 674 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984), rev'd, 692 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc); Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d
344, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc); Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1979)).
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evaluation is left to the trial judge, and his decision will not be disturbed
absent a clear abuse of discretion. 292 In Templin the court convicted the
defendant of murdering his wife by electrocution. The prosecution intro-
duced testimony that the defendant, when he was a child, told three of his
relatives that he electrocuted dogs and cats. The court of criminal appeals
held that the testimony was relevant 293 and that the state's argument was all
the more compelling because the prosecution was based entirely on circum-
stantial evidence. 294 Nonetheless, because of the relative youth of the de-
fendant at the time of the acts of misconduct and because the prejudicial and
inflammatory nature of the evidence was so great as to outweigh its proba-
tive value, the court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction.295 A simi-
lar result was reached in Clark v. State.296 The State introduced testimony
that the defendant, accused of forgery, had also forged checks of a former
employer. The prosecution argued that since it was relying upon circum-
stantial evidence, it was entitled to introduce the extrinsic evidence to prove
the defendant's intent and motive to commit theft as well as a common sys-
tem, scheme, or plan. 297 The opinion first stated that the state cannot offer
evidence of nonrelated offenses to prove an element of the offense if the pros-
ecution has other evidence establishing the element that the defendant does
not contest. 298 If the defense cross-examination goes to the heart of the
prosecution's evidence, the evidence is contested.299 If the cross-examina-
tion, however, only suggests the possibility that the appellant did not com-
mit the offense, tangentially challenging the issue of identity, the state's
evidence is not contested, and evidence of extraneous matters is not
admissible. 300
In Ostos v. State 30 1 the court of appeals reversed a voluntary manslaughter
conviction because the state introduced testimony from a police officer that
he arrested the defendant after a high speed chase on an extraneous matter
and that the defendant threatened the officer. 30 2 The prosecution offered
evidence to rebut defense testimony that the defendant enjoyed a good repu-
tation for being peaceful and law-abiding. In reversing, the court of appeals
292. 711 S.W.2d at 33.
293. Id. The court found the testimony to be relevant to show knowledge of how electricity
works, to identify the defendant as a person who in the past habitually caused death by electro-
cution, and to rebut the defense of accident.
294. The opinion made clear that the fact that the case was based on circumstantial evi-
dence would no longer cause it to be evaluated under a different standard than a direct evi-
dence case. Id. at 33. See also Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en
banc) (standard for review of sufficiency of evidence is same in both direct and circumstantial
evidence cases); (citing Griffin v. State, 614 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
295. 711 S.W.2d at 33-34.
296. No. 508-84 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 1986) (not yet reported). Clark was a 5-4
decision with two judges concurring in the results.
297. Id., slip op. at 3.
298. Id., slip op. at 3-4 (citing several cases, including Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877
(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
299. Id., slip op. at 4 (quoting Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
300. Id., slip op. at 4.
301. 713 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.).
302. Id. at 403.
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affirmed application of the rule excluding unrelated offenses unless a clear
exception exists.30 3 In Escort v. State 304 the defendant alleged self-defense to
the charge of murdering her husband. The court permitted the prosecution
to offer testimony that the defendant served a sentence in the penitentiary for
killing a previous husband.30 5 The court of appeals first noted that since no
testimony was admitted on the circumstances of the killing of defendant's
first spouse, the extraneous offense was not relevant. 306 Further, the court
held that introduction of the extraneous offense was unnecessary. 30 7 Since
the jury assessed a maximum penalty, the court of appeals reversed the
conviction. 308
C. Witnesses
The court of criminal appeals avoided deciding whether hypnotically in-
duced testimony is admissible in Texas state courts by holding in Vester v.
State 309 that such testimony was harmless because it was cumulative of ad-
missible identification testimony. 3 10 Judge Clinton's concurring opinion ana-
lyzed in detail the admissibility of such hypnotically induced testimony.311
His conclusion, though, was that the major objections to the hypnotically
induced testimony were not preserved and, therefore, not before the
court.3 12 The core issue of admissibility of such testimony was also
presented to the Tyler court of appeals in Gaudette v. State,313 but that court
also sidestepped the issue by holding that an independent basis for the in-
court identification other than the hypnotic session existed.314 In addition,
the circumstances surrounding the identification were not so impermissibly
suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifi-
cation at trial. 315
Two other cases were decided during the Survey period concerning wit-
303. Id. at 404.
304. 713 S.W.2d at 733 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.).
305. Id. at 735.
306. Id. at 737.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 739.
309. 684 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), aff'd 713 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
310. 713 S.W.2d at 924. The court held that a sufficient "independent origin" of the in-
court identification existed so that the hypnotic session was not so impermissibly suggestive as
to give rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Id.
311. Id. at 924-39 (Clinton, J., concurring). On the issue of hypnotically induced testi-
mony see Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 332-34 (1980); Mickenberg, Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of Hypnoti-
cally-Induced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 927, 951-52 (1983); Orne,
The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT. J. CLINICAL EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311
(1979); Note: Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony in Criminal Trials: Current Trends and Ra-
tionales, 19 Hous. L. REV. 765, 774-77 (1982).
312. 713 S.W.2d at 937.
313. 713 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no pet.).
314. Id. at 210.
315. Id. at 211.
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nesses. In Villarreal v. State316 the court of criminal appeals held that an
eleven-year-old juvenile could not be an accomplice as a matter of law since
the witness could not be prosecuted as an adult. 317 In Archer v. State318 the
court of criminal appeals revised the test to determine whether a violation of
"the rule" results in harm.3 19 Now, the test is (1) did the witness actually
hear the testimony or confer with another witness without court permission
and (2) did the witness give testimony that corroborated another witness for
the prosecution or contradicted defensive testimony. 320
D. Exclusion of Testimony
In Crane v. Kentucky 32' the petitioner attempted to introduce testimony
at his trial describing the length and manner of interrogation resulting in his
confession. Petitioner hoped to show, because of the way the confession was
made, that the confession was unworthy of belief. The trial court had previ-
ously determined the confession was voluntary. The trial court and the
Kentucky Supreme Court held that the testimony was excludable, stating
that the testimony was only admissible on the issue of voluntariness. 322 The
United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice O'Connor,
held that the exclusion of the testimony deprived the accused of his funda-
mental constitutional right, whether under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment or the compulsory process or confrontation clauses
of the sixth amendment, to a fair opportunity to present a defense. 323
316. 685 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985), aff'd, 708 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (en banc).
317. 708 S.W.2d at 848. An "accomplice witness" is one who has participated before,
during, or after the commission of a crime, and "one is not an 'accomplice witness' who cannot
be prosecuted for the offense with which the accused is charged." Id. at 847 (citing several
cases, including Harris v. State, 645 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc). For a
discussion of the accomplice witness rule see infra notes 398-408.
318. 703 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
319. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.03 (Vernon 1981) reads in part:
At the request of either party, the witnesses on both sides may be sworn and
placed in the custody of an office and removed out of the courtroom to some
place where they cannot hear the testimony as delivered by another witness in
the cause. This is termed placing witness under the rule.
The prior test was established in Haas v. State, 498 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973): (1)
did the witness actually hear testimony of the other, and (2) did the witness's testimony contra-
dict the testimony of the witness he actually heard. Id. at 210.
320. 703 S.W.2d at 666-67.
321. 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986).
322. Crane v. Commonwealth, 690 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Ky. 1985).
323. The opinion stated:
Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, . . . or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, ... the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaning-
ful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S., at 485 ... ; cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 684-685...
(1984). ("The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process
Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the sev-
eral provisions of the Sixth Amendment."). We break no new ground in observ-
ing that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be
heard. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 ... (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394... (1914). That opportunity would be an empty one if the state were
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The defendant in Kirby v. State3 24 sought to introduce the results of a
blood test in a DWI prosecution, but the trial court sustained the state's
objection for failure to maintain an adequate chain of custody. 325 The court
of appeals reversed, noting that the objections went to the weight of the
proffered testimony, not the admissibility. 326
E. Bolstering
In Graham v. State327 the defendant agreed to take a breath test after
being arrested for DWI, but no qualified operator for the intoxilyzer could
be found. At Graham's trial, however, the court permitted the arresting
officer, who by his own admission was not a qualified operator of the breath
test device, to testify that he had seen persons who were less intoxicated than
the defendant fail the test. 328 The court of criminal appeals reversed, hold-
ing that since the officer was not a qualified intoxilyzer operator he was not
qualified to express an opinion comparing the defendant with others.329 In
Campbell v. State 330 the court convicted the defendant of murder. The pros-
ecution based its case on the testimony of Jackson, who, besides testifying
that she was paid $400 after identifying the defendant, was thoroughly im-
peached. The court permitted the state to offer a police officer's testimony
about three prior consistent statements given by Jackson. The opinion of the
court of criminal appeals reviewed the law concerning prior consistent state-
ments, compared it with the new rules of criminal evidence and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and concluded that the new rules of evidence on the sub-
ject, although appearing to be different at first glance, are actually the
same.331 The court in Rains v. State332 cited the old rule as follows:
It is well settled that where a witness has been impeached by showing
that he made other and different statements in regard to the matter than
those testified to by him on the trial, he can be supported by showing
that he made similar statements to those testified to by him recently
after the occurrence. However, if the supporting statement was made
permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a
confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence.
In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of this kind of exculpa-
tory evidence deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's
case encounter and "survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 ... (1984).
Id. at 2146-47, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 645.
324. 713 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.).
325. The State's specific objections were: (1) the sample was not given an identification
number from the inception, (2) the vial was not given a security seal after the blood sample was
drawn, (3) it bore an unrelated label indicating possible prior contamination, and (4) the custo-
dial chain as broken during the defendant's incarceration (the jailer kept the sample until the
defendant was released). Id. at 222.
326. Id.
327. 665 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 710 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
328. Id. at 590-91.
329. Id. at 591-92.
330. 718 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
331. Id. at 715-17.
332. 140 Tex. Crim. 548, 551, 146 S.W.2d 176, 178 (1940).
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after a motive or inducment existed to fabricate, the supporting state-
ment is then inadmissible. 333
Rule 801(e)(1) of the new rules of criminal evidence concerns a witness's
prior consistent statement and provides such statements are not hearsay if
"[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-exami-
nation concerning the statement, and the statement is ... consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . ." 334The opinion
noted that the new rule of evidence contained no requirement that the prior
consistent statement be made before the time when the motive to fabricate
arose. 335 The Federal Rules of Evidence on the point have been interpreted
to require that the consistent statement be made prior to the time a motive to
fabricate existed. 336 The opinion in Campbell, therefore, held that the Texas
rule will also include the requirement. 337
F Other Cases Involving Trial Procedure
At the cost of thirty days in jail, seven persons in Ex parte Krupps338
learned that when the bailiff cries, "All rise," before the judge enters the
courtroom, the trial court is serious. In Krupps, a five-to-four decision with
two judges concurring in the results, the court of criminal appeals denied
writ of habeas corpus contesting the contempt citations, holding that refusal
to rise when the judge enters a courtroom was a proper ground for criminal
contempt. 339
The defendant in Holbrook v. Flynn 340 contended that the presence of four
uniformed state troopers sitting in the first row of the spectators' section
deprived him of his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court stated that
whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial,
the question is not whether the jurors articulated a consciousness of some
prejudicial effect, but whether an unjustifiable risk of prejudice existed.34'
The Court then held that under the circumstances of the multi-defendant
333. Id. (citing Browney v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 81, 88-89, 79 S.W.2d 311, 3135 (1934)).
334. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 801 (e)(1), supra note 253.
335. 718 S.W.2d at 715.
336. United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1978) (interpreting Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)).
337. 718 S.W.2d at 717. The concurring opinion of Judge Teague criticized the use of the
new rules of evidence to cases tried before these rules were effective. Id. (Teague, J.,
concurring).
338. 712 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc), application for stay of enforcement
of order of confinement granted, 107 S. Ct. 641 (1986).
339. Id. at 150-51. No law exists in Texas providing that everyone must stand when thejudge enters the courtroom. The opinion was based on the common law, which allows a
conviction for contempt under the notion of disrespect to the court. Id. at 150 n.9 ("A direct
refusal to rise upon the judge's entrance interrupts the normal proceedings of the court, disre-
gards the formality and seriousness of the court's' function, and directly conflicts with the
'imperative need of the community in having an established forum .... ' " Id. at 150-51 (citing
United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 665 (4th Cir. 1974) (Widener, J., dissenting)).
340. 106 S. Ct. 1340, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986).
341. Id. at 1347, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 535.
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trial the risk of prejudice was not constitutionally significant. 342
The Texarkana court of appeals considered in Woods v. State 343 whether a
child witness was competent to testify when the child's testimony was
presented by video tape and the child was not sworn in as a witness. 344 The
defendants contended that the testimony of the victim was insufficient to
support their convictions because no formal oath was administered before
the video taped interview. The court held that a child is competent to testify
if she understands what it means to tell the truth and that she is under an
obligation to testify truthfully.345
Article 1.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the mechanics
for a stipulation of evidence in a trial before the court.346 In Lopez v.
State347 the defendant and his attorney signed the stipulation, but the trial
judge did not sign it. The court held that the absence of the trial judge's
signature from a stipulation of evidence constituted a violation of article
1.15's requirement that the trial court approve the stipulation in writing and
was fundamental error requiring reversal.348 The court reached a similar
342. Id. at 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 536.
343. 713 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no pet.).
344. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1987), which provides for
the videotaping of child witnesses in sexual abuse cases, has been held unconstitutional on
confrontation grounds. See Long v. State, 694 S.W.2d 185, 187-93 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985,
no pet.) (section 2 of act unconstitutional); Powell v. State, 694 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1985, no pet.) (sections 4 and 5 of statute unconstitutional); see also Whittmore v. State,
712 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986 no pet.) (statute constitutional); Jolly v. State,
681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.) (same). All four cases are
based on the confrontation clauses of the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
345. 713 S.W.2d at 174.
346. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (Vernon 1977) provides:
No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury...
unless in felony cases ... the defendant ... has ... waived his right of trial by
jury... ; provided, however, that it shall be necessary.., to introduce evidence
... showing the guilt of the defendant .... The evidence may be stipulated if
the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the ap-
pearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further con-
sents either to an oral stipulation ... or ... affidavits, written statements fo
witnesses, and any other documentary evidence .... Such waiver and consent
must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of
the cause.
347. 708 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
348. Id. at 448-49. The opinion specifically held that the error could be raised for the first
time on a petition for discretionary review. Id. at 448 (citing Valdez v. State, 555 S.W.2d 463,
464 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Rodrigues v. State, 534 S.W.2d 335, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977) allows a defendant to waive trial by
jury, but states that the waiver must be in writing and signed by the defendant, his attorney,
the attorney for the state, and be approved by the judge. Unlike article 1. 15 cases, however,
the court of criminal appeals has held in Vega v. State, 707 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (on state's motion for rehearing) (en banc) that, absent an affirmative showing to the
contrary, the presumption of regularity of the judgment controls. That is to say, a defendant
must make an affirmative showing that he did not execute a written waiver of trial by jury by
bill of exception or by objection in the record. See also Romero v. State, 712 S.W.2d 636, 638-
39 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no pet.), which holds that if the judgment does not indicate
that the right to a jury trial was waived, the presumption of regularity will not save the
conviction.
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result in Messer v. State.349 The court, however, did not find the error to be
fundamental; instead the court held that without the stipulation no evidence
existed to support the conviction. 350 The court, therefore, reversed the
conviction. 351
The final case in this section concerns the discretionary power that the
court has in controlling the examination of witnesses. In Bradeen v. State 352
the court of appeals held that the trial court had the discretion to allow
redirect examination to exceed the scope of the cross-examination. 353
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S CHARGE TO THE JURY AND JURY NOTES
A. Presumptions
As noted last year,354 the Supreme Court in Francis v. Franklin355 left
open the question of whether an erroneous charge that shifts the burden of
persuasion to the defendant on an essential element of the offense can ever be
harmless error. In Rose v. Clark 356 the defendant claimed insanity, thereby
contesting the malice element of the offense charged. The judge instructed
the jury that "if the State has proven beyond a reasonable ... doubt that a
killing has occurred, then it is presumed that the killing was done mali-
ciously."'357 The circuit court of appeals held the instruction was unconsti-
tutional pursuant to Sandstrom v. Montana 358 and that since the defendant
contested malice, the error could not be harmless despite the substantial evi-
dence of guilt. 359 The Court indicated that the list of constitutional errors
that can never be considered harmless is quite short, 360 and held that if the
basic rights to the assistance of counsel and trial by an impartial adjudicator
are provided, a presumption exists that the harmless error standard should
be applied in determining if any error constitutes reversible error. 36' The
Court then held the Chapman harmless error standard362 applied and re-
manded to the circuit court for the determination if the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. 363 Mr. Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion,
criticized the majority's equation of fundamental fairness with trial accu-
349. No. 570-84 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet reported).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. 711 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
353. Id. at 265.
354. See Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 631-32.
355. 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985).
356. 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986).
357. Id. at 3104, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 468 (omission in original).
358. 442 U.S. 510 (1979). Sandstrom held that a jury instruction creating a presumption
that has the effect of either eliminating intent as an issue, or of shifting the burden of proof as
to intent to the defendant, violates due process. Id. at 524.
359. Cf Clark v. Rose, 762 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1985) (decision without published opinion).
360. 106 S. Ct. at 3106, 92 L. Ed. at 470. The list was comprised of the introduction of a
coerced confession, the complete denial of the right to counsel, adjudication by a biased judge
or jury, and the directing of a verdict for the prosecution.
361. Id. at 3107, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 471.
362. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). For a discussion of the Chapman
standard see supra note 261.
363. 106 S. Ct. at 3109, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 474.
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racy, insisting that concerns about reliability and accuracy are not the only
considerations in determining the applicability of the harmless error
analysis. 364
B. Culpable Mental States, Causation, and Other Statutory Requirements
In Alvarado v. State365 the defendant was charged with injury to a child in
violation of section 22.04 of the Penal Code. 36 6 The defendant submitted
requested jury instructions limiting the definitions of the culpable mental
states to that which relates only to the result of the conduct. 367 The trial
court's refusal to limit the definitions of the culpable mental states was held
to be error. The court of criminal appeals held that the statutory definitions
in chapter 6 of the Penal Code deal with the nature of conduct, the circum-
stances surrounding conduct and the result of conduct. 368 Further, under
Beggs v. State,369 the statute applicable to an injury to a child focuses on the
result of the suspect's conduct.370 The requested limiting instructions, there-
fore, were proper and should have been given. 371 The expanded definition of
the culpable mental states permitted the jury to convict upon a theory not
alleged in the statute or indictment. 372
In Robbins v. State 37 3 and Crabb v. State 374 the court of criminal appeals
considered the problems raised by concurrent causations to alleged criminal
conduct. In Robbins the defendant was charged with involuntary man-
slaughter by driving while intoxicated. Robbins defended by saying that the
accident was caused by exhaustion as opposed to intoxication. The court
instructed the jury that if they found that the defendant was intoxicated,
they must also find that "such intoxication, if any, caused the ... death...
or contributed to cause same."' 375 The defendant objected because the
364. 106 S. Ct. at 3111-12, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 476-78.
365. 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
366. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides: "A person commits
an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in
conduct that causes bodily injury ... to a child...
367. 704 S.W.2d at 37. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a), (b) (Vernon 1974) defines
uclpable mental state as follows:
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or of circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts know-
ingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
368. 704 S.W.2d at 38 (citing Graham v. State, 557 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983);
Lugo v. State, 650 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (Clinton, J., concurring
opinion)).
369. 597 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
370. Id. at 377.
371. Id. at 379-80.
372. 704 S.W.2d at 39-40.
373. 717 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
374. 717 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
375. 717 S.W.2d at 350.
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phrase "contributed to cause same" lessened the state's burden of proof.376
The court of criminal appeals held that, although no charge on causation
was necessary, if the trial court gave such an instruction, the charge must be
proper.377 The use of the term "contributed" without any restriction on
degree of contribution was error since it authorized the jury to convict under
a lesser standard than required by section 6.04(a) of the Penal Code. 378 The
degree of contribution of both causes makes a difference because if the con-
current cause is clearly sufficient and the conduct of the defendant clearly
insufficient to produce the result, the jury is not entitled to convict. 379 The
court remanded the cause to the court of appeals to review harm in accord-
ance with the Almanza 380 standard. 381 The court of criminal appeals ren-
dered a similar result in Crabb.382
Concerning the rule of law that a defendant is entitled to an affirmative
defensive instruction on every such issue raised by the evidence, Sanders v.
State383 held that after enactment of the 1974 Penal Code the rule applied
only to the defenses listed in the Penal Code. In Thomas v. State384 the
court held the renunciation defense provided in section 15.04 of the Penal
Code385 was available as an affirmative defense even if the defendant com-
mitted the completed offense of attempt, as defined in section 15.01 of the
Penal Code. 386 Finally, in concluding this section, MacDougall v. State387
held that although an indictment does not have to define the term "decep-
tion" in a theft case, the definition must be given in the jury instructions if
theft by deception was a theory of prosecution and the defense requested the
instruction.388
376. Id.
377. Id. at 351.
378. Id. at 352. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person is
criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating
either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly suffi-
cient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient."
379. 717 S.W.2d at 352.
380. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (if a correct special
request or proper objection to the trial court's charge was made, a showing of "some harm"
will result in reversal).
381. 717 S.W.2d at 353.
382. 717 S.W.2d at 355.
383. 707 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986 (en banc).
384. 708 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
385. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.04(a) (Vernon 1974) provides:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under Section 15.01 of this code that
under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his
criminal objective the actor avoided commission of the offense attempted by
abandoning his criminal conduct or, if abandonment was insufficient to avoid
commission of the offense, by taking further affirmative action that prevented
the commission.
386. Id. § 15.01 (Vernon Supp. 1987) states: "A person commits an offense if, with specific
intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that
tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended."
387. 702 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
388. Id. at 652.
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C. Lesser Included Offenses
In Royster v. State 389 the court of criminal appeals enunciated a two-part
test to determine whether a charge on a lesser included offense was required.
First, the lesser included offense must be included within the proof necessary
to establish the offense charged; second, the record must contain some evi-
dence that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense.390
In Carter v. State391 the defendant was charged with an convicted of aggra-
vated sexual assault. He contended that the court should have instructed the
jury on a lesser offense of sexual assault. The court of appeals held that
testimony by the complainant that she did not believe any particular act of
appellant caused her to fear for her life did not show that she was not in fear
for her life.392 The court then noted that only when conflicting evidence
concerning an element of the greater offense not an element of the lesser
offense exists that a charge on the lesser offense must be given. 393
The court of criminal appeals in Ojeda v. State 394 held that the defendant
was not entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary man-
slaughter when being tried for murder.395 The court recognized that a
charge on the lesser included offense is required if evidence from any source
raises the issue, regardless of the credibility or whether it is controverted or
conflicts with other evidence, but held that since no direct evidence396 ex-
isted as to the defendant's apparent frame of mind at the time of the inci-
dent, the lesser offense was not raised. Judge Clinton dissented saying that
the requirement for direct evidence was an "unconscionable usurpation of
the jury's prerogative. '397
D. Accomplices and Parties
In Ross v. State 398 the Dallas court of appeals first summarized the ac-
complice witness rule. 399 The court then held that a person whose participa-
tion amounted to nothing more than mere presence, who did nothing to
389. 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
390. Id. at 446-47.
391. 713 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.).
392. Id. at 448.
393. Id.
394. 712 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en bane).
395. Id. at 744.
396. The evidence presented on objective recitation of the facts; that defendant was hit and
he responded. There was no evidence that he was cool and collected or enraged at being hit
and seeing his girlfriend hit. Id. at 744.
397. Id. at 745 (Clinton, J., dissenting opinion).
398. 715 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
399. The opinion stated:
1) An accomplice witness is one who has participated with another before,
during or after commission of a crime. 2) Whether an individual is an accom-
plice depends on whether the individual, acting with intent to promote or assist
in the commission of the crime, solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to
aid in commission of the offense. 3) The test to determine whether a witness is
an accomplice is whether a prosecution will lie against him under the indictment
by which the accused was charged. 4) Where there is a conflict in the evi-
dence, the court should charge the jury on whether the witness was an accom-
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assist or encourage the offense, who took no affirmative steps to conceal the
fruits of the crime or participants, or whose actions did not further the of-
fense in any way or frustrate the investigation, was not an accomplice as a
matter of law and no jury instruction was necessary.400 Burns v. State4° 1
addressed the problem of accomplice testimony corroborated only by the
defendant's confession. The jury had been instructed on voluntariness of the
confession and on the accomplice witness rule, which requires corrobora-
tion, but, over objection, left the question of whether the witness was an
accomplice to the jury. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that
since the co-indictee was an accomplice as a matter of law he had to be
corroborated. 402 Since the jury could have found the confession involuntary,
and thus not capable of corroborating the accomplice's testimony, and could
have found the co-indictee not to be an accomplice, the defendant may have
been convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.4 3
Since the defense had submitted a proper requested instruction and shown
some harm under A lmanza410 4 reversal was required. 405
In capital cases a special rule required that, upon request, the jury must be
instructed that the accomplice witness's testimony must be corroborated as
to the specific elements that make the offense a capital case.406 That rule
was expressly overruled in Holladay v. State.40 7 The court of criminal ap-
peals held that in capital cases involving accomplice witness testimony, upon
request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the accomplice witness
testimony must be corroborated with evidence tending to connect the ac-
cused to the offense, but no longer needs to be corroborated as to both the
murder and the act raising the murder to capital offense status.4a08
With reference to the law of parties,4°9 the San Antonio court of appeals
in Gordon v. State410 held that a jury charge on parties does not have to
specifically identify the parties acting with the accused when applying the
plice as a matter of fact. 5) A witness is not an accomplice solely by virtue of
presence at the scene of the crime or merely for failing to disclose the offense.
Id. at 57.
400. Id.
401. 703 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
402. Id. at 652.
403. Id.
404. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). For a discussion of
the Almanza rule see supra note 380.
405. 703 S.W.2d at 362.
406. County v. State, 668 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc); Forten-
berry v. State, 579 S.W.2d 482, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
407. 682 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), rev'd, 709 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
408. 709 S.W.2d at 199-202.
409. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 1974) provides: "A person is criminally
responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committee by his own conduct, by the
conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Criminal responsibil-
ity, is defined in part as "if. .. acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the
offense, [a person] solicits, encourages, directs, aids or attempts to aid the other person to
commit the offense." Id. § 7.02 (a)(3).
410. 714 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no pet.).
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law to the facts. 411
E. Comments on the Weight of the Evidence
In Drewett v. State412 the county did not videotape the defendant after her
DWI arrest as required by statute.413 The trial court instructed the jury that
they could not consider the lack of videotape as either evidence or
nonevidence of intoxication. The statute requiring the videotape specifically
provided that the failure to videotape was admissible at trial.414 The court
of criminal appeals reversed, holding the instruction was a comment on the
weight of the evidence, which deprived the defendant of his right to com-
ment on admissible evidence. 41 5 The decision in Browning v. State416 dealt
with numerous legal axioms erroniously labeled presumptions.417 The opin-
ion held that the instruction to the jury on evidentiary presumptions was a
comment on the weight of the evidence except for those labeled in the Penal
Code.418 The court reasoned that the axioms were not evidentiary presump-
tions, but were only permissible inferences that allow a finding of sufficiency
on appeal or in a motion for instructed verdict.419
F. Charges on Punishment
The Dallas court of appeals reversed a DWI conviction in Martinez v.
State.4 20 The jury charge on punishment filed to inform the jury that they
could probate either jail time or fine without probating both. Since the de-
fendant was denied the opportunity to have the jury consider the whole
range of punishment, and the jury did not probate either the jail sentence or
the fine, he showed egregious harm under A lmanza421 and was entitled to a
reversal even though the defendant did not raise an objection at the trial
court. 422 In Cane v. State423 the court of criminal appeals held that it was
within the trial court's discretion to charge the jury on punishments on the
objectives of the Penal Code;424 however, the trial court should have charged
411. Id. at 77.
412. 686 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981), rev'd, 704 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986).
413. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987) and TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon Supp. 1987) (both quoting Tex. S.B. 303, 68th Leg. (1983)).
414. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 19.05 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
415. 704 S.W.2d at 45.
416. 720 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986).
417. Id. at 507. For example, the court cited axioms such as the intent to commit theft is
presumed from nighttime entry and guilt of theft is presumed from unexplained recent posses-
sion of stolen property.
418. Id. at 507-08.
419. Id.
420. 714 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
421. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
422. 714 S.W. 2d at 44.
423. 698 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984), rev'd, 698 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (en banc).
424. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.02 (Vernon 1974) (provides that the purposes of the
code are:
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on all six objectives, not just the first three.42 5
G. Almanza and Fundamental Error
The Almanza426 tests for determining reversible error did result in a
number of reversals. As noted earlier in Martinez v. State,42 7 the failure to
charge the jury on the whole range of punishment resulted in fundamental
reversible error when the accused did not receive the minimum punish-
ment. 428 In Castillo-Fuentes v. State,429 a murder case, the court held the
failure to negate "sudden passion" 430 to be fundamental reversible error
since voluntary manslaughter was the primary defense. 431 Castillo-Fuentes
must be compared with Lawrence v. State432 in which the failure to negate
sudden passion was not reversible error because the voluntary manslaughter
issue was held to be incidental to the theory of defense. 433 The court held
the punishment charge in Ellis v. State434 to be fundamental reversible error
because it erroneously told the jury that the judge could impose only nine of
the fourteen conditions of probation permitted by statute435 and it errone-
ously stated that the trial judge could not add other conditions of proba-
(1) to insure the public safety through: (A) the deterrent influce of the
penalties hereinafter provided; (B) the rehabilitation of those convicted of vio-
lations of this code; and (C) such punishment as may be necessary to prevent
likely recurrence of criminal behavior;
(2) by definition and grading of offenses to give fair warning of what is pro-
hibited and of the consequences of violation;
(3) to prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriouness of offenses
and that permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibities among
individual offenders;
(4) to safeguard conduct that is without guilt from condemnation as crimi-
nal;
(5) to guide and limit the exercise of official discretion in law enforcement to
prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of
offenses; and
(6) to define the scope of state interest in law enforcement against specific
offenses and to systematize the exercise of state criminal jurisdiction.
425. 698 S.W.2d at 140-41.
426. 645 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (en banc.). In Alamanza, the court adopted a two-prong test for analyzing error
contained in a trial court's charge to the jury. If the error is considered ordinary reversible
error, an objection or requested instruction is necessary to preserve the error, but only some
harm is necessary to cause a reversal. If no objection or requested instruction was filed, the
error must be fundamental, and only error so egregious and harmful so as to deprive the
accused of a fair trial will result in a reversal. See Keck, 1985 Annual Survey, supra note 72,
634-36.
427. Martinez v. State, 714 S.W.2d (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
428. See supra text accompanying notes 420-22.
429. 707 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
430. Cobarrubio v. State, 675 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (requires
the negation of sudden passion if the issue is raised by the evidence before a jury is allowed to
return a verdict of guilty to the offense of murder).
431. 707 S.W.2d at 562.
432. 699 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983), rev'd, 700 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
433. 700 S.W.2d at 212.
434. 723 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
435. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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tion.436 The egregious harm was shown because the only issue involved in
the guilty plea to a jury was that of the suitability of probation. 43 7 The mur-
der conviction in Holley v. State438 was reversed because the charge permit-
ted the jury to convict on an uncharged theory of felony murder; recklessly
committing or attempting to commit injury to a child which resulted in
death.439 Although other cases involved fundamental error/egregious error,
the above cases indicate that fundamentally erroneous charges are still caus-
ing reversals when the instruction permits a conviction for uncharged con-
duct and evidence indicates the uncharged conduct, when the instruction
affects the range of punishment, or when the instruction affects a defensive
theory supported by the evidence.
H. Reading Testimony After a Jury Note
In Jones v. State440 the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court
must go beyond the literal interpretation of the jury note and give it a realis-
tic interpretation, regardless of the statutory admonition in article 36.28 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. 44' Article 36.28 limits the jury note to
"that part of such witness testimony or the particular point in dispute, and
no other.' '442 When both direct examination and cross-examination exists
on a point in dispute defined in the jury note, therefore, both must be read
back to the jury.443
VI. PROSECUTORIAL ARGUMENT
As noted in the previous Survey, 4" claims that prosecutors exceeded the
bounds of proper jury argument form the basis of many appeals in criminal
cases. Two court of appeals decisions bear on issues that will probably be
recurring problems as opposed to situational losses of perspective involved in
most of the argument cases. In Davis v. State445 the prosecutor commented
on the new law concerning the jury instruction on parole.446 The statute
also expressly forbids consideration by the jury of the manner in which the
436. Id.
437. 723 S.W.2d at 673.
438. 713 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no pet.).
439. Id. at 384.
440. 680 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), rev'd, 706 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
441. 706 S.W.2d at 668.
442. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.28 (Vernon 1981).
443. 706 S.W.2d at 668.
444. See Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 641.
445. 712 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
446. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides that
the jury shall be instructed:
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be
imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term
of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time
served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less,
without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant
is sentenced to a term of less than six year, he must serve at least two years
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parole law may apply." 7 The prosecutor argued: "[The charge] says if you
... sentence him to six years in the penitentiary, he is guaranteed to serve
two. That's what it says. Multiply about ten, what does it mean? You as-
sess a 60 year sentence. '" 8 The jury assessed a sixty-year sentence. The
court of appeals affirmed, noting that the argument came perilously close to
error, but did not cross the line into impermissible comment.449 In Gaddis v.
State450 the prosecutor argued in a DWI case where the accused refused a
breath test: "You know why he refuses? Because if he blows in the
machine, the game is over."'451 The court of appeals reversed, stating that
the state may not suggest in final argument that evidence, which was not
present at trial, provides additional grounds for finding the accused guilty. 452
VII. PUNISHMENT AND SENTENCING
A. Judicial Vindictiveness
In Pearce v. North Carolina453 the Supreme Court confronted the "judi-
cial vindictiveness" that can appear to motivate a judge to impose a higher
sentence on a retrial when the defendant successfully appealed. Pearce rec-
ognized a presumption of vindictiveness when a harsher sentence is assessed
the second time around. 454 In order to rebut the presumption, the trial
court must justify the harsher sentence with objective information concern-
ing the defendant's conduct subsequent to the original sentencing proceed-
ing.455 The Supreme Court's opinion in Texas v. McCullough416 severely
limited Pearce. First, the Court held that the Pearce presumption did not
arise when the sentencing court itself sets the stage for the retrial by granting
before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that
parole will be granted.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time
might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison
and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time.
However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be
awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the
manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
447. Id.
448. 712 S.W.2d at 828.
449. Id. at 829.
450. 714 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
451. Id. at 459.
452. Id. at 460. In an interesting test to determine harm, the court held that the prejudicial
effect of the argument outweighed its probative value. Id. This test is the same as that to
determine admissibility of extraneous offenses, Templin v. State, 711 S:W.2d 30, 33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc), and is the rule to determine admissibility of evidence under the
new rules of criminal evidence. See TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 403, supra note 253. The problem
with the test is that argument is not supposed to have probative value in itself. See Todd v.
State, 598 S.W.2d 286, 296-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (argument may be (1) summation of
evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from evidence, (3) answer to opposing counsel, and (4) plea
for law enforcement).
453. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
454. Id. at 725-26.
455. Id. at 276.
456. 106 S. Ct. 976, 89 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1986).
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a motion for new trial. 457 Second, the Court deemed the presumption not
applicable when a jury imposed the first sentence but a judge imposed the
second sentence.458 Finally, McCullough made clear that information not
presented at the first trial is admissible to refute the presumption of
vindictiveness. 459
B. Other Supreme Court Cases Concerning Punishment and Sentencing
The Supreme Court also decided, in Ford v. Wainwright,46° that the eighth
amendment 46' prohibits a state from inflicting the death penalty upon a pris-
oner who is insane.462 A plurality of the Court also held that the state must
establish a procedure to determine post-trial insanity that provides the con-
demned the opportunity to be heard, 463 the opportunity to clarify or chal-
lenge the state's experts or methods, 464 and the right for judicial review.465
In Skipper v. South Carolina 466 the Court reversed a death sentence because
the defendant was prohibited from offering mitigating testimony that he had
adjusted well to incarceration. The Court held that its prior opinions in
Lockett v. Ohio4 6 7 and Eddings v. Oklahoma 468 gave the defendant the right
to give the jury all relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment.
C. Affirmative Finding that a Deadly Weapon Was Used or Exhibited
As noted in the last Survey,469 an affirmative finding by the trier of fact
that a defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon critically affects the eli-
gibility for probation and service of the sentence. Polk v. State470 established
the ways in which an affirmative finding may be made when the jury is the
trier of facts.471 In Fann v. State472 the court of criminal appeals held that
when the punishment hearing is held before the trial judge, the judge is the
457. Id. at 979, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
458. Id. at 980, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
459. Id. at 982, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 113-14.
460. 106 S. Ct. 2595, 91 L. Ed. 2d 335 (1986).
461. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
462. 106 S. Ct. at 2602, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 346.
463. Id. at 2604-05, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 345.
464. Id. at 2605, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
465. Id.
466. 106 S. Ct. 1669, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986).
467. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
468. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
469. See Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 647-48.
470. 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
471. The opinion stated that an affirmative finding in such circumstances could be made if:
(1) the jury returns a verdict of guilty as charged in the indictment and the indictment specifi-
cally alleges the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or firearm; (2) the jury returns a verdict
of guilty as charged in the indictment and the indictment, rather than using the nomenclature
"deadly weapon," specifies a weapon such as a pistol or other type of firearm that is per se a
deadly weapon; or (3) the jury answers affirmatively a special issue regarding the defendant's
use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or firearm. 693 S.W.2d at 394; see also Campbell v. State,
No. 69,620 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet reported) (if jury finds defendant guilty
as charged in indictment and indictment alleges handgun was used, affirmative finding exists).
472. 702 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (on state's motion for rehearing).
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trier of facts as to punishment issues and has the authority to make the af-
firmative finding.473
Article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure474 provides that a trial
court can make restitution a condition of probation. Nowhere in the statu-
tory language does the legislature say that restitution is made only to victims
of the crime. In Jones v. State,4 7 5 therefore, the Tyler court of appeals up-
held restitution for the benefit of an insurance company that had paid the
complaining witness.476 The opinion noted that the only limitation on resti-
tution is the due process requirement that the amount be just.4 77
In a case somewhat similar to Thi Van Le v. Perkins478 the trial court
originally granted an accused's application for probation in Romero v.
State479 and then later revoked the probation and assessed a two-year sen-
tence. The court based the revocation on the fact that the defendant refused
to sign the probation order. The appellate court noted that article 42.12 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure480 does not require the defendant to sign the
probation order, and held that after the first sentence was imposed, the trial
court was without power to vacate the sentence and order a new sentence.481
The final case in this section concerns good time credits and jail terms
ordered as a condition of probation. 482 In Ex parte Cruthirds483 the court of
criminal appeals held that good time credits484 only apply to sentences, not
to periods of confinement that are conditions of probation.485
VIII. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF APPEAL
Just as the adoption of the rules of criminal evidence during the last two
months of the Survey period created problems with surveying the procedural
aspects of trial,486 the adoption of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure48 7
has created a significant change in the procedural aspects of appeal. The
quantity and quality of the changes are of much significance as to be the
subject of a law review article alone and are beyond the scope of this Survey.
473. Id. at 604-05.
474. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
475. 713 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1986, no pet.).
476. Id. at 797 (citing Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (payment of
restitution to insurance company implicitly approved)).
477. Id.
478. 700 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. App.-Austin 1985, no pet.).
479. 712 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no pet.).
480. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
481. 712 S.W.2d at 638.
482. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 6b(c) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (requiring
court to order jail sentence of not less than 120 days if probation is granted to defendant
convicted of involuntary manslaughter caused while operating a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05(a)(2) (Vernon 1974).
483. 697 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), aff'd, 712 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
484. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5118(a) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1987).
485. 712 S.W.2d at 753.
486. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
487. VERNON'S' TEXAS STATUTES AND CODES ANNOTATED: INTERIM ANNOTATION
SERVICE No. 1, at 326-86 (April 1986); see also TEX. R. APP. P. (Vernon Special Pam. 1987).
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This Article will attempt to identify the major developments during the Sur-
vey period that the new rules do not change.488
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
In Morris v. State489 the defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bar-
gain and gave notice of appeal to contest an adverse ruling on a pretrial
motion. 490 On appeal the only issue raised was the insufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the plea of guilty. Under the statutory authority for such
appeals, 491 the defendant can appeal only those matters raised by adverse
pretrial rulings. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.4 92
In Dorsey v. State4 9 3 the Fort Worth court of appeals reviewed the require-
ments for appealing a conviction in which the defendant pleaded guilty pur-
suant to a plea bargain. In order to invoke appellate jurisdiction the
appellant must show: (1) the existence of a plea bargain; (2) punishment
assessed by the trial court within the recommendation of the prosecutor and
agreement by the appellant; and (3) the basis of the appellate ground of error
being the denial of a written pretrial motion or the trial court giving permis-
sion to pursue an appeal.4 94 Oral notices of appeal are no longer permitted
under the new rules.4 95
B. Preservation of Error
Moosavi v. State496 involved the attempt by a defendant to preserve error
when the trial court excluded proffered testimony. Defense counsel briefly
stated into the record what he expected the excluded testimony to prove.497
The court of appeals held that the defendant did not preserve error because
the record did not show the specific questions and answers. 498 The court of
criminal appeals reversed, holding that article 40.09, section 6(d)(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure only requires a concise statement of what the
excluded evidence would show.499 As noted in Casares v. State,5°° however,
if no offer of proof is made, nothing is preserved for appellate purposes.
488. See Fitzgerald, Criminal Appellate Practice: State of Texas, in STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ADVANCED CRIMINAL LAW COURSE § N (August 1986) for a detailed analysis of the new
appellate rules.
489. No. 197-84 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 1986) (not yet reported) (rehearing pending).
490. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
491. Id.
492. No. 197-84, slip op. at 5.
493. 713 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.).
494. Id. at 432 (citing Galitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981 (en banc)).
495. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b)(1), supra note 487.
496. 671 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd, 711 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc).
497. 711 S.W.2d at 54.
498. 671 S.W.2d at 574-75.
499. 711 S.W.2d at 55. The opinion stated: "In a case ... where the question itself is not
objectionable but, rather the expected testimonial response, it serves no purpose to require an
offer of proof to contain the questions to be asked. This is especially true where the subject
matter of the question is evident." 711 S.W.2d at 56. Article 40.09 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure was repealed with the adoption of the new appellate rules, with rule 50 of those
rules replacing the statute. See TEX. R. App. P. 50, supra note 487.
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Because of the numerous cases that have held the defendant did not prop-
erly preserve error the rest of this section summarizes briefly some of the
proper rules applicable in preserving error. Objections must be made each
time allegedly improper questions are asked, or answers or arguments are
made. 501 The objection at trial must comport with the complaint raised on
appeal. 50 2 Error is not preserved unless the defendant obtains an adverse
ruling.50 3 The appellant bears the burden to develop the appellate record to
show reversible error. 504 The appellate courts have the power to review only
grounds of error raised by the defendant's brief and unassigned error that
should be reviewed in the interests of justice. 505
C. The Record on Appeal
Abdnor v. State,50 6 noted in the last Survey,507 was a court of appeals
decision that held that an appellant who failed to testify at his indigency
hearing did not make a prima facie case of indigency, and was not entitled to
a transcript at county expense. 508 The court of criminal appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that a defendant need not testify if he can prove
indigency by other witnesses. 50 9 In this case the defendant's father and legal
guardian showed firsthand knowledge of the defendant's financial condition,
the evidence was uncontroverted, and no further evidence was required. 510
The court of criminal appeals held in Farris v. State 51  that an attempt by
the trial court to supplement a record after the appellate record had been
filed in the court of appeals was invalid.512 The court further held that new
500. 712 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.). See also McKib-
bon v. State, 714 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no pet.).
501. Johnson v. State, 713 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no pet.).
502. Gonzales v. State, 714 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
503. Parker v. State, 713 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.).
504. Id. at 391.
505. Koffel v. State, 714 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no pet.) (citing
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09 (Vernon 1979)). The opinion incorrectly referred to
a section of the Code of Criminal Procedure that had been repealed prior to 1981 and a search
of the old and new rules of appellate procedure do not show that the provision for reived "in
the interests of justice" have been retained. Lopez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986) and Carter v. State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), however,
both hold that all appellate courts have the jurisdiction to review unassigned error.
506. 687 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), rev'd, 712 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). This case was not the first time the issue of this defendant's status as an indigent had
been litigated. See Abdnor v. State, 635 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982), aff'd, 653
S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc). The court of criminal appeals expressly disap-
proved the court of appeals' determination that the appellant must testify, and may not call
witnesses in his behalf, at an indigency hearing. 653 S.W.2d at 794 n.2.
507. See Keck & Johnson, 1986 Annual Survey, supra note 84, at 671.
508. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 40.09(5) (Vernon 1979), then in effect, which
provided that the transcripts of those appellants determined to be indigent are to be paid for
out of the general fund of the county in which the offense was alleged to have been committed.
The statute has been repealed and is replaced by rule 43(j) of the new appellate rules. TEX. R.
App. P. 43(j), supra note 487.
509. 712 S.W.2d at 143.
510. Id. at 138.
511. 676 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.], rev'd, 712 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (en banc).
512. 712 S.W.2d at 514. Several months after the appellate record was filed, testimony was
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
evidence developed subsequent to any proceedings surrounding a defend-
ant's trial does not constitute part of a defendant's record within the mean-
ing "record on appeal." 5 1
3
D. Bail Pending Appeal
Article 44.04 of the Code of Criminal Procedure5 14 authorizes denial of
bail only if good cause exists to believe that one convicted of a felony offense
will not appear when his conviction becomes final or is likely to commit
another offense while on bail. The Hunter v. State51 5 and Ex parte Shock-
1ey 516 decisions both held that even if not required by the statute, due pro-
cess does require that the trial judge give notice and hold a hearing before
denying bond or raising bond pending appeal. In some limited situations a
defendant may be entitled to bond even after incarceration. In Ex Parte
Curry5 17 the defendant withdrew her notice of appeal and began her prison
sentence. She was later released on parole. Subsequently, a nunc pro tunc
order was entered indicating that she had used a deadly weapon in the com-
mission of the offense, thus delaying the parole eligibility date.518 When she
sought to appeal the nunc pro tunc order the trial court denied her request
for bail pending appeal. The court of appeals held that, since Curry had the
right to appeal the nunc pro tunc order, she was entitled to bail. 519
E. Petitions for Discretionary Review
In a significant opinion the court of criminal appeals in Degrate v. State 520
refused a petition because it did not set forth the reasons why the court
should consider the case.52 ' Appellant had presented several grounds for
error, which were an exact duplication of the grounds presented to the court
of appeals. The petition was held not to follow the requirements of rule
304(d) of the post-trial and appellate rules, 522 which require the petition to
state the reasons, as identified in rule 302(c) of the same rules, 523 for grant-
presented in a wholly unconnected case that showed the prosecution had withheld evidence at
Farris's trial of promises made to an accomplice regarding leniency in exchange for testimony.
The trial court tried to supplement the appellate record with this testimony.
513. Id. at 515.
514. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04 (Vernon 1986).
515. No. 770-85 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 1985) (not yet reported).
516. 683 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985), rev'd, 717 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (en banc).
517. 712 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no pet.).
518. Id. at 879 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp.
1987)).
519. Id. at 880-81 (citing Shaw v. State, 539 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), as au-
thority for right to appeal, and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04 (Vernon Supp. 1987)
and Ex parte Davis, 574 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), as authority for right to bail
pending appeal).
520. 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
521. Id. at 757.
522. TEX. R. CRIM. App. P. 304(d)(5) (Vernon 1948), now TEX. R. App. P. 202(d)(5),
supra note 487.
523. TEX. R. CRIM. App. P. 302(c) (Vernon 1948), now TEX. R. App. P. 200 (c), supra
note 487. Both provide:
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ing review. 524 The emphasis was on the importance to the jurisprudence of
the state and not the effect on the parties. The court stated that "[t]he asser-
tion that the court of appeals was in error as to some point of law, standing
alone, may be insufficient to require further review."'525
F. Test for Sufficiency on Appeal
Two opinions by the court of criminal appeals created new law concerning
the tests for sufficiency of evidence on appeal. The first case involves the
proper appellate standard for determining whether sufficient evidence exists
to support a jury's implicit rejection of an affirmative defense. In Van Guil-
der v. State526 the court held that the appellate court
must review the evidence on the affirmative defense by looking at the
evidence in the light most favorable to the implicit finding by the jury
with respect to such affirmative defense and then determine, by examin-
ing all the evidence concerning the affirmative defense, if any rational
trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove his
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 527
The Van Guilder court found that, because the evidence of insanity was so
great and because the state offered no evidence to rebut the defensive theory,
no rational trier of fact could have found that the defense was not proved by
a preponderance of the evidence. 528 The opinion in Schuessler v. State529
indicates how little evidence is needed to convince the hypothetical rational
trier of fact. Schuessler also involved overwhelming uncontradicted evidence
that the defendant had a mental illness. The state's expert, however, chal-
lenged the reliability of retroactive diagnosis: the process of examining a
In determining whether to grant or deny discretionary review, the following,
while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court of Criminal Appeals'
discretion, indicates the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another court of appeals on the same matter;
(2) Where a court of appeals has decided an important question of state or
federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by the Court of Criminal
Appeals;
(3) Where a court of appeals has decided an important question of state or
federal law in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Court of Criminal
Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States;
(4) Where a court of appeals has declared unconstitutional, or appears to
have misconstrued, a statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance;
(5) Where the justices of the court of appeals have disagreed upon a material
question of law necessary to its decision; and
(6) Where a court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of the Court of Criminal Appeals' power of
supervision.
524. 712 S.W.2d at 756-57.
525. Id. at 756.
526. 674 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984), aff'd, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (en banc).
527. 709 S.W.2d at 181.
528. Id. at 183.
529. 647 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983), rev'd, 719 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986).
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patient and then determining that he suffered a specific ailment at a time
prior to the examination. Additionally, lay witnesses testified about the de-
fendant's conduct while in jail. This testimony, although not contradicting
the defendant's expert witnesses, was sufficient for the court to hold that a
rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove the
defense of insanity by a preponderance of evidence.5 30
The second significant case involving appellate standards of sufficiency of
evidence is Chambers v. State.53' Chambers abolished two established rules.
First, the court abandoned the long standing practice of disregarding inad-
missible hearsay in determining evidentiary sufficiency on appeal.5 32 The
court then considered another long-standing rule that in a weak circumstan-
tial evidence case in which the record shows not only that other testimony
was available, which would have cast additional light on the facts, but also
that the prosecution did not introduce the evidence or satisfactorily account
for its failure to do so, the appellate court must hold the evidence insuffi-
cient.5 33 Holding the standard of a "weak circumstantial evidence case" to
be inconsistent with those cases that held the standard of review for suffi-
ciency of evidence cases to be the same in both direct and circumstantial
evidence cases,534 and stemming from the untenable presumption that the
state's failure to produce and failure to account for nonproduction of avail-
able testimony creates reasonable doubt as a matter of law, the opinion
stated5 35 that henceforth the proper standard for review in all cases was that
established in Jackson v. Virginia.5 36
530. 719 S.W.2d at 330. The depth of analysis needed to understand Van Guilder and
Schuessler is far greater than permitted in a survey of law article. The reader is invited to read
Judge Clinton's dissent in Schuessler, id. at 330-32, and the court of appeals decision in Meraz
v. State, 714 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no pet.) (finding of competency held to be
against great weight and preponderance of evidence, a test apparently rejected in Van Guilder).
531. 711 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
532. Id. at 245-47, reversing Alvarado v. State, 632 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982),
and Gutierrez v. State, 628 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), specifically, and inferentially all
similar cases from Belverman v. State, 16 Tex. 131 (Tex.. 1856), through Gardner v. State, 699
S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
533. See Cruz v. State, 482 S.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Ysasaga v. State,
444 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
534. See Carlsen v. State, 654 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc).
535. 711 S.W.2d at 251.
536. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (whether after viewing all evidence in light most favorable to
prosecution, any rationale trier of fact could have found essential elements of offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.).
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